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## T-R&D

***A. Interpretation—***

***1. Nuclear energy production is measured by installed capacity***

**IAEA 8** [International Atomic Energy Agency, “A Newsletter of the Division of Nuclear Power,” Nuclear Power Newsletter, Vol. 5, No. 3, September, <http://www.iaea.org/Resources/Women/pdf/nenp0908.pdf>]

**Energy production of nuclear power** plants is a result of an **installed capacity and effectiveness of its utilization**. In 2007 there was no permanent shutdown, compared to eight in 2006, therefore the installed capacity was driven by investment into construction of new NPPs and into power uprating of existing reactor units. Three new reactors were connected to the grid and one long-term shutdown reactor was reconnected. The total installed capacity of the nuclear industry has risen from 369.8 to 372.2 GW(e) during 2007. Utilization of installed capacity can be measured by the energy availability factor (EAF). It is the percentage of maximum energy generation the plant is ready to supply to the electrical grid to meet its demand.

***2. Production incentives are used to stimulate output—distinct from R&D***

**Suranovic 10** [Steve, associate professor of economics and international affairs at the George Washington University, PhD in economics from Cornell, International Trade: Theory and Policy, v. 1.0, “8.2 Domestic Production Subsidies,” <http://catalog.flatworldknowledge.com/bookhub/reader/28?e=fwk-61960-ch08_s02>]

Domestic production subsidies are generally used for two main reasons. First, subsidies provide a way of raising the incomes of producers in a particular industry. This is in part why many countries apply production subsidies on agricultural commodities: it raises the incomes of farmers. The second reason to use production subsidies is to stimulate output of a particular good. This might be done because the product is assumed to be critical for national security. This argument is sometimes used to justify subsidies to agricultural goods, as well as steel, motor vehicles, the aerospace industry, and many other products. Countries might also wish to subsidize certain industries if it is believed that the industries are important in stimulating growth of the economy. This is the reason many companies receive research and development (R&D) subsidies. Although **R&D subsidies are not strictly production subsidies**, they can have similar effects.

***3. For is exclusive***

**Clegg, 95** - J.D., 1981 Yale Law School; the author is vice president and general counsel of the National Legal Center for the Public Interest. (Roger, “Reclaiming The Text of The Takings Clause,” 46 S.C. L. Rev. 531, Summer, lexis)

Even if it made no sense to limit the clause to takings "for public use"--and, as discussed below, it might make very good sense--that is the way the clause reads. It is not at all ambiguous. The prepositional phrase simply cannot be read as broadening rather than narrowing the clause's scope. Indeed, a prepositional phrase beginning with "for" appears twice more in the Fifth Amendment, and in both cases there is no doubt that **the phrase is narrowing** the scope of the Amendment. n20

## Immigration DA

#### Immigration will pass now, but it’s not inevitable

JOHN BUCHANAN, 3-27-13, Highlands Today, Immigration reform looms, <http://www2.highlandstoday.com/list/highlands-agri-leader-news/immigration-reform-looms-b82469915z1>, jj

- As bipartisan Congressional support for immigration reform gains momentum, the ongoing and critical issue of a consistently available work force for farmers is at the center of the debate.¶ The end result of the difficult process could be a long-awaited boon for growers or a disaster.¶ That’s why a new national organization, the Agriculture Workforce Coalition, has been formed to aggressively address the issue. Founding members include the Florida Fruit and Vegetable Association and the group’s efforts are strongly supported by Florida Farm Bureau and Florida Citrus Mutual, and Florida Nursery, Growers & Landscape Association.¶ And despite political gridlock that has so far prevented the passage of a new farm bill, Congress is listening, with Florida members taking a leadership role in the discussions.¶ “For me, it’s always been about listening to my farmers, because my district is now mainly agricultural,” said Rep. Tom Rooney, R-Fla., a former member of the agriculture committee who now sits on the agricultural appropriations committee. “So on this issue, I feel like I am in Washington on behalf of the farmers I represent. So whatever plan comes out has to be acceptable to them.”¶ Rooney and his colleagues from the Florida delegation, including fellow Republicans Sen. Marco Rubio, and Reps. Mario Diaz-Balart and Dennis Ross, have been actively engaged in discussions with AWC and other agricultural organizations.¶ There is now broad consensus that a readily available field labor force is essential to the country’s food supply and therefore a national security issue, said Mike Carlton, director of labor relations at the FFVA and a regular participant in AWC’s Washington meetings. “But it has taken a decade to educate Congress as to the unique nature of the agricultural work force and the problems we have.”¶ Rooney said he is now relatively confident that immigration reform efforts will deliver badly needed practical improvements for farmers.¶ “The best outcome I can see, based on the current discussions, is that we get reforms to a guest worker program, which will allow us on the flip side to do something like eVerify to make sure that the people who are here are the ones who are supposed to be here and that out guest workers are also contributing to taxes,” Rooney said. “Then they can come and go as they please. They can make money and go home, without feeling like they’re breaking the law. And then farmers can feel like they can employ a work force without fearing the government is going to crack down on them.”¶ Under the current system, farmers who want to legally employ immigrant laborers must either participate in an existing but deeply flawed H2A guest worker program or administer workers under I-9 forms.¶ At the core of the current debate is the need for a new or significantly revised guest worker program that does not incur the costs or administrative burdens of H2A program.¶ And finding the right balance carries risks, Rooney said.¶ “My idea of a worst-case scenario would be that an enforcement mechanism like eVerify is put in place, without a guest worker program,” he said. “And then you’ll see what we’ve already seen in places like South Carolina and Georgia, where farmers are being told they can’t have this labor, but they can’t find anybody else that will do the job. At that point, we wouldn’t be able to get crops picked and to the table. And that would be a national security issue.”¶ Michael W. Sparks, CEO and executive vice president of Florida Citrus Mutual and another participant in the AWC’s Washington campaign, concurred with that assessment.¶ “I absolutely could not agree more,” he said. “It would be devastating to U.S. agriculture and especially devastating to Florida.”¶ Unless reforms seriously address the concerns of growers and create a system that makes workers consistently available, Sparks said, the recent problems that have plagued farmers in South Carolina, Georgia and Alabama as a result of state-level crackdowns on illegal immigrants could spread nationwide. “And just as you did in some of those states, you’d see crops rotting in the field because they’re not getting harvested,” Sparks said.¶ Despite such gravity, however, there is no certainty that an immigration reform bill will pass Congress in this session.¶ “But I will say that we are probably closer than we have ever been,” Carlton said. “And although there has been gridlock in Washington over the last few years, the strident nature of that gridlock seems to have diminished considerably more recently, at least when it comes to this issue.”¶ Rooney pegged the likelihood of passage during the current session at 50/50. “But the issue of immigration reform does seem to now have more bipartisan support than it ever did before,” he said. “So that does make it more likely that it could happen. But based on the climate I’ve seen in the last Congress and this Congress, it has been very difficult to get anything done.”

***Conflicting priorities means nuclear costs PC --- the debate is stalemated now***

**Bryce ‘10**

Robert Bryce, has been writing about energy for nearly two decades. His articles have appeared in dozens of publications ranging from The Atlantic Monthly to The Guardian, and The Nation to The American Conservative. He is the author of Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego, and the Death of Enron, and Cronies: Oil, the Bushes, and the Rise of Texas, America’s Superstate. Bryce is a fellow at the Institute for Energy Research, as well as the managing editor of Energy Tribune and a contributing writer for The Texas Observer.

“Power Hungry: The Myths of "Green" Energy and the Real Fuels of the Future” pg 269-270, jj

The answers are here. **What’s lacking aren’t answers, but political will**. **That’s not to say the challenge of handling nuclear waste can be solved easily or cheaply.** **Coming up with a long-term solution will take** years of work, lots of money, and **sustained support from Congress**. And that’s the crux of the problem: **Nuclear power requires strong governmental involvement**. One analyst summed it up well when he told me, “**The Re publicans like nuclear, but they hate government. The Democrats like government but they hate nuclear power** **And those conflicting views have contributed to the stalemate on nuclear power development in the United States.**

**That stalemate is most obvious when it comes to dealing with nu clear waste**. In 2009, the Obama administration—bowing to pressure from Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid, who hails from Nevada— decimated funding for the waste disposal site at Yucca Mountain. Ad ministration officials said they were abandoning the project and would begin looking for other waste sites.3 Reids political power play has left the United States without a long-term program or even the beginnings of one to deal with its spent nuclear fuel.4 Reid’s NIMBY posturing may be handy politics for Nevada, but it effectively renders moot a two- decade-old federal law that requires the federal government to take pos session of the high-level waste produced by the country’s nuclear power plants. It also means that the two decades and $13.5 billion of taxpayers’ money that has been spent researching and developing the site at Yucca Mountain (which is ready for use and only awaits licensing) has effec tively gone up in smoke— thereby adding just a bit more carbon dioxide to the atmosphere.5

#### Capital’s key

The Anniston Star Editorial Board, 3-27-13, On the offensive: Obama is wise to start anew the push for immigration reform, <http://annistonstar.com/view/full_story/22088295/article-On-the-offensive--Obama-is-wise-to-start-anew-the-push-for-immigration-reform?instance=opinion_lead>, jj

Nevertheless, Obama is wise to go on this offensive. The need, as always, is great.¶ An Associated Press report this week points out that the president is working behind the scenes in order to keep Republicans at the negotiating table between now and Congress’ April 8 return from spring break. The key is the Senate working group, the Gang of Eight, that is putting together a bipartisan plan the White House has yet to see. “We’ll reserve judgment on the product of those discussions until it’s produced,” White House spokesman Josh Earnest said.¶ Here is where we’d like to see the professorial Obama take an aggressive stance and will Congress to pass the immigration reform this nation needs. Unfortunately, even in his second term Obama is facing overwhelming Republican opposition on virtually all matters of policy. His is a precarious perch: push too hard and risk a Republican storm; push meekly and risk ineffectiveness.

#### CIR solves the deficit

Tucker 10 Cynthia is a columnist for The Atlanta Journal-Constitution. “We need immigrants to help pay the deficit,” Nov 19, <http://blogs.ajc.com/cynthia-tucker/2010/11/19/we-need-immigrants-to-help-pay-the-deficit/>

Recommendations for taming the deficit include raising the retirement age, raising the federal gas tax and ending the mortgage interest deduction for homeowners. Ouch!¶ But there is a palliative that would ease the pain: Put 11 million illegal immigrants on a path to legalization. And don’t touch birthright citizenship!¶ Yes, you heard that right: Granting legal residency to illegal immigrants will eventually help sop up some of the federal budget’s red ink. I know that’s counterintuitive since so many citizens have come to believe that Mexican landscapers and Guatemalan maids are a drain on the treasury. But the fact is that their relative youth is just what the U.S. economy needs.¶ The explosion of the long-term deficit is largely the consequence of an aging population, with more retirees depending on taxes from fewer workers. While the recession, two unfunded wars and Bush-era tax cuts fueled the immediate deficit, a tsunami of long-term red ink will swamp the budget in about ten years, as a massive wave of baby boomers leaves the workplace.¶ So we need as many younger workers as we can find to help support the coming crush of senior citizens. The U.S. is lucky enough to have a higher birthrate than many other Westernized democracies, even among native-born women. Immigrants are an added demographic bonus.¶ “When some people think of immigrants, they think of people coming in and immediately absorbing our resources,” said Emory economist Jeffrey Rosensweig. “Most immigrants come here to work. They’re young workers, and they’re paying taxes.” Why not add all of them to the federal tax rolls?

***Deficit reduction key to prevent economic collapse, abrupt retrenchment and great power war***

**Khalilzad 11** — Zalmay Khalilzad, the one and only, was the United States ambassador to Afghanistan, Iraq, and the United Nations during the presidency of George W. Bush and the director of policy planning at the Defense Department from 1990 to 1992. National Review Online, 2-8, The Economy and National Security, <http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad?pg=3>, jj

Today, **economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the** U**nited** S**tates’ position as global leader**. While the United States suffers from **fiscal imbalances** and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends **could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers.**

**The current recession is the result of a deep financial crisis**, not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. **The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy** — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. **The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path**. **Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years.**

**Without** faster economic growth and **actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions**. **If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments** — which already are larger than the defense budget — **would crowd out other spending or require substantial tax increases that would undercut economic growth**. Even worse, **if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally.**

**Such scenarios would reshape the international order**. **It was the economic devastation of Britain and France** during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, **that led both countries to relinquish their empires**. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. **If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments.**

We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. **These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act** and other powers continue to grow, **it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation.**

**The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership**. By contrast, **multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars.**

**American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats**. Under this scenario, **there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict**. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, **hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions.**

As rival powers rise, **Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition**. **Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities**. **China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims** — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — **have roiled** its **relations** with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression.

Given the risks, **the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition** while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today.

**The policy question is how to enhance economic growth and employment while cutting discretionary spending** in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options.

The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications.

As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways.

While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done.

Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China.

**Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation** in combination with the rise of rival powers **will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.**

## Advantage CP

#### The United States federal government should offer to host a commercial spent nuclear fuel storage facility for international customers. The United States should invite the IAEA to assist in the monitoring of this facility and the provision of the services. The United States federal government should take steps to increase security at HEU storage facilities, including but not limited to, consolidation of sites containing nuclear material, streamlining contracting procedures for nuclear sites and federalizing nuclear security forces. The United States federal government should should engage Moscow on a new bilateral round of nuclear arms reductions and pursue a cooperative missile defense arrangement with Russia.

***CP solves prolif, fuel security, and removes the need for reprocessing***

**Goldberg et. al 12**—\*\*Stephen M. Goldberg is Special Assistant to the Director at Argonne National Laboratory. In this capacity, he has conducted several systems studies in the nuclear energy field, including the 2004 study on the economic competitiveness of nuclear energy, the 2007 Poland nuclear energy study, and the 2009 Jordan cogeneration study. Previously, he served in the U.S. government for more than three decades. While at the Office of Management and Budget, he received the Executive Office of the President’s highest award for efforts to complete several major international nuclear nonproliferation agreements, including the multibillion dollar U.S. purchase of highly enriched uranium extracted from Soviet nuclear weapons. He is a Senior Fellow at the Energy Policy Institute at Chicago (EPIC) and is Research Coordinator for the American Academy’s Global Nuclear Future Initiative.

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AMERICAN ACADEMY OF ARTS & SCIENCES, The Back-End of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: An Innovative Storage Concept, 2012, <http://www.amacad.org/pdfs/backend.pdf>, jj

**For customers, the important feature of the proposed regional facility is the alleviation of increasing used fuel inventories at reactor fuel pools**. The recent events at Fukushima Daiichi have heightened public concerns about long-term storage at these pools. In addition, and as pointed out in the previous section, **the proposed regional storage facility could reduce back-end fuel cycle liability for emerging nuclear states**. **Some emerging states, such as the United Arab Emirates, have expressed a desire to mitigate back-end fuel cycle concerns altogether, and would thus consider it a welcome option for used fuel to be stored longterm outside of their state in an internationally safeguarded facility**. Aside from states with small used nuclear fuel inventories, it is worth noting the benefit to those states where use of nuclear power may decline from its current level; for example, as a consequence of heavy political pressure**, German policy-makers recently announced an end to that state’s nuclear power industry. This concept would prompt such states to remove their used fuel stockpiles to a regional facility.**

**For the international nuclear community, the primary attraction of the proposed facility is the nonproliferation benefits associated with having a centralized, safeguarded storage facility as opposed to numerous isolated facilities**. **This facility would provide a much more economical solution than development of in-state conventional reprocessing**, advanced chemical partitioning, or disposal capabilities, ***thereby reducing the incentive for emergent nuclear states to pursue their own back-end fuel cycle capabilities***. **The primary concern of the international community would be siting the facility in a state with a stable government and a strong, transparent relationship with the international nuclear community.**

**For the host state, fees charged to the facility would generate revenue; operation and maintenance needs would create jobs; and the owner of the facility would generate revenue through long-term storage contracts with customers.** Further, the host state could be home to a research facility dedicated to advanced waste forms, pre-treatment options, and understanding used fuel and storage canister behavior over extended storage periods (that is, beyond the nominal sixty-year expected life of existing dry storage systems). Additionally, the host state would benefit from infrastructure development; indeed, improvements to roads, rail, electricity, fresh water, and water treatment would all be required to move fuel into and out of the facility. Thus, **the host state would profit directly, from fees related to the facility, but would also benefit from long-term employment related to facility operation, security, maintenance, and regulatory functions, as well as opportunities created by a back-end R&D facility.**

## SK DA

***US won’t cave to South Korea on reprocessing now***

**Yonhap**, 3-8-**2012**, “U.S. unlikely to allow S. Korea to reprocess nuclear fuel,” http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2012/03/08/23/0301000000AEN20120308007100315F.HTML

**The U**nited **S**tates **is unlikely to allow South Korea to adopt** its indigenous technology aimed at **reprocessing** highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel in their negotiations to revise a bilateral nuclear accord, a senior Seoul diplomat involved in the talks said Thursday. The **refusal** by U.S. negotiators **stemmed from a "*deep-rooted distrust*" of South Korea**, which had once authorized a clandestine nuclear weapons program in the early 1970s under former president Park Jung-hee but shut it down under pressure from Washington, the diplomat said on the condition of anonymity. **Rather than pressing the U.S. to allow** South Korea to adopt the proliferation-resistant reprocessing technology, called "**pyroprocessing**," **Seoul is focusing on revising** the nuclear accord to make it easier **to export nuclear power** plants, the diplomat said.

***Failure to maintain a hardline on domestic reprocessing shatters the norm against ENR and makes credible US diplomatic pressure impossible – ensures South Korean ENR***

Scott **Sagan**, poly sci prof @ Stanford, co-chair Global Nuclear Future Initiative, 4-18-20**11**, “The International Security Implications of U.S. Domestic Nuclear Power Decisions,” http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120621005012/http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/sagan\_brc\_paper\_final.pdf

A similar phenomenon occurs when **policy makers** and scholars **underestimate the international effect of the U.S. decision to abandon** plutonium **reprocessing** in the 1970s. Skeptics claim that the fact that France and Japan, especially, went forward with their ambitious plutonium reprocessing efforts somehow demonstrates that U.S. efforts to constrain the global growth were a failure. But a more appropriate standard (but again more difficult to measure) for assessing our influence would estimate the number of states that would have developed plutonium reprocessing capabilities if the U.S. had not actively discouraged such fuel cycle activities after Jimmy Carter’s April 1997 order to cancel construction of commercial breeder reactors that employed a closed fuel cycle with plutonium reprocessing. **The primary motivation behind the decision to postpone** the development of this technology **was** a concern for the **prolif**eration implications of the U.S. use of a closed fuel cycle. 17 The Carter administration reasoned that **the decision to end reprocessing in the U.S. would have two effects**: first, **the U.S. could no longer act as an exporter** of related technologies, **limiting** their **availability**; and second, **it would create a *normative change* that would redefine the behavior of a responsible nuclear power state.** Because we are estimating a counterfactual condition, it is not possible to measure definitively the effects of the Carter policy on the actual spread of reprocessing facilities around the world. Of the twenty-one countries that at some point in their history pursued plutonium reprocessing, ten have finished large-scale facilities and use them today: U.S., China, Israel, France, UK, India, Japan, Pakistan, Russia, and North Korea. 18 Algeria and the Czech Republic have a pilot-scale reprocessing plants, but have not moved towards further industrial development. 19 Nine countries abandoned their reprocessing programs: South Korea, Taiwan, Germany, Iraq, Italy, Argentina, Brazil, Belgium, and Yugoslavia. 20 The causes of these reversal decisions were complex, but in many of the cases **U.S. *diplomatic pressure* was an important factor and** that pressure was ***made more credible* and acceptable because the U.S had *given up* its own** civilian plutonium **reprocessing** programs. **This “credibility” factor continues to be important** today. **South Korea is lobbying to renegotiate** its agreements with the U.S. to be able to develop “pyro-processing,” a form of spent fuel **reprocessing** that supporters claim poses fewer proliferation risks than standard PUREX acqueous reprocessing. While this appears a challenge to the claim that the U.S. policy has had a positive influence, **the very fact that the South Koreans are actively arguing** that pyro-processing – unlike the PUREX process – does not separate out plutonium **shows** their **awareness of the *power of the norm* against developing such tech**nologies. While the U.S. government initially cooperated with South Korea on pyroprocessing research, Richard Stratford (Director of the Office of Nuclear Energy Affairs in the Bureau of Nonproliferation, U. S. Department of State) recently stated that the technology “moved to the point that the product is dangerous from a proliferation point of view,” and that the DOE now “states frankly and positively that pyro-processing is reprocessing.” **The U.S. government position against pyro-processing in South Korea** today **is *made more credible* by the fact that the U.S. does not reprocess** spend fuel for commercial purposes. 21

***South Korean ENR causes South Korean prolif and undermines US nonprolif efforts with Iran, North Korea, and Southeast Asia***

Zachary **Keck 12,** Assistant Editor of The Diplomat, “Rough Waters? The State of the ROK-U.S. Alliance,” The Diplomat, 8-22-12, http://thediplomat.com/flashpoints-blog/2012/08/22/rough-waters-the-state-of-the-rok-u-s-alliance/

Washington’s **concerns over South Korean’s nuclear ambitions have only been heightened by Seoul’s latest campaign to acquire indigenous enrichment and reprocessing facilities**, which it is proscribed from doing under a nuclear pact it signed with Washington in 1974. In contrast, the U.S. has signed agreements recognizing Japan’s reprocessing and enrichment rights as well as India’s de facto reprocessing capability. Now**, with the U.S. and South Korea renegotiating the** 1974 nucle**ar pact that will expire in 2014, South Korea has demanded that Washington acquiesce to Seoul building enrichment and processing facilities.** South Korea’s immediate interest in acquiring these capabilities is not nuclear weapons but rather further expanding its nuclear energy industry at home and abroad. Nonetheless, **the U.S. has rejected South Korea’s request thus far**, with President Obama’s top proliferation adviser, Garry Samore, telling South Korean reporters last month, “There is no danger that Korean industry will not be able to get access to low enriched uranium," **Washington has a number of reasons to oppose South Korea’s request**, many of which have nothing to do with Seoul. For instance, **a key component of** President **Obama’s nuclear security agenda is the goal of securing all nuclear materials worldwide within four years. Allowing South Korea to begin producing its own fissile materials would run counter to this goal and undercut the administration’s important successes in reducing the number of countries that possess and produce these materials.** **Allowing South Korea to build these facilities would also *undermine the current U.S.-led campaign to persuade Iran to abandon its own enrichment facilities*. It would** also **adversely affect a number of U.S. objectives in the Asia-Pacific**, ***including persuading Pyongyang to surrender its own nuclear program*, according Japan a heightened status among U.S. allies, and *keeping Southeast Asia’s budding nuclear energy programs on their current peaceful trajectories.*** Under the surface, however, **Washington’s opposition is likely due in part to its uncertainty over South Korea’s long-term nuclear intentions.** As noted above, **South Korea already has a history of covertly seeking nuclear arms**. That this took place before Seoul became a democracy is cold comfort to the U.S given that **South Koreans have at times been overwhelming in favor of their country acquiring nuclear weapons.** In other words, **at a time when the region is undergoing sweeping changes, the U.S. is increasingly less confident that South Korea will continue to rely on Washington for its security indefinitely. Indeed, there are already a number of signs that** Seoul is seeking greater autonomy. **These come at a time when the U.S. will need South Korea more than ever in order to properly rebalance its forces in the region.**

***New Asian prolif ensures widespread nuclear conflict --- asymmetries***

**Lyon 9** (December, Program Director, Strategy and International, with Australian Strategic Policy Institute, previously a Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Queensland, “A delicate issue, Asia’s nuclear future”)

**Deterrence relationships in Asia won’t look like East–West deterrence. They won’t be relationships of mutual assured destruction (MAD), and there will be many asymmetries among them. Regional nuclear-weapon states will articulate a spectrum of strategies ranging from existential deterrence to minimum deterrence to assured retaliation; and sometimes doctrinal statements will outrun capabilities.** The smaller arsenals of Asia and the absence of severe confrontations will help to keep doctrines at the level of generalised deterrence. Extended nuclear deterrence will continue to be important to US allies in East Asia, although it is hard to imagine other Asian nuclear weapon states ‘extending’ deterrence to their clients or allies. Alagappa’s propositions contain a ‘picture’ of what a more proliferated Asia might look like. It could well remain a region where deterrence dominates, and where arsenals are typically constrained: an Asia, in fact, that falls some way short of a ‘nuclear chaos’ model of unrestrained proliferation and mushrooming nuclear dangers. An order in flux? Notwithstanding Alagappa’s more reassuring view, we shouldn’t understate the extent of the looming change from a nuclear relationship based on bipolar symmetry to a set of relationships based on multiplayer asymmetries. As one observer has noted, when you add to that change the relatively constrained size of nuclear arsenals in Asia, the likelihood of further nuclear reductions by the US and Russia, and ballistic missile defences of uncertain effectiveness, the world is about to enter uncharted territory (Ford 2009:125). Some factors certainly act as stabilising influences on the current nuclear order, not least that nuclear weapons (here as elsewhere) typically induce caution, that the regional great powers tend to get along reasonably well with each other and that the region enters its era of nuclear pre-eminence inheriting a strong set of robust norms and regimes from the earlier nuclear era. But other factors imply a period of looming change: **geopolitical dynamism is rearranging strategic relationships; the number of risk-tolerant adversaries seems to be increasing**; most nuclear weapons states are modernising their arsenals; the American arsenal is ageing; and the US’s position of primacy is increasingly contested in Asia. Indeed, it may be that dynamism which could most seriously undermine the Solingen model of East Asian nonproliferation. Solingen, after all, has not attempted to produce a general theory about proliferation; she has attempted to explain only proliferation in the post-NPT age (see Solingen 2007:3), when the P-5 of the UN Security Council already had nuclear weapons. In essence, though, it’s exactly that broader geopolitical order that might be shifting. It isn’t yet clear how the Asian nuclear order will evolve. It’s one of those uncertainties that define Australia’s shifting strategic environment. It’s not too hard to imagine an order that’s more competitive than the one we see now. The ‘managed system of deterrence’ The second approach to thinking about the Asian nuclear order is to attempt to superimpose upon it William Walker’s two key mechanisms of the first nuclear age: the ‘managed system of deterrence’ and the ‘managed system of abstinence’. What might those ‘systems’ look like in Asia? In Walker’s model, the managed system of deterrence included: the deployment of military hardware under increasingly sophisticated command and control; the development of strategic doctrines to ensure mutual vulnerability and restraint; and the establishment of arms control processes through which policy elites engaged in dialogue and negotiated binding agreements. (Walker 2007:436) **It isn’t obvious that those core aspects of the ‘managed’ system are all central features of Asian nuclear relationships**. Perhaps most importantly, it isn’t obvious that the world even has a good model for how deterrence works in asymmetric relationships. Within the US, there’s been something of a revival of interest in matters nuclear as strategic analysts attempt to reconceptualise how nuclear relationships might work in the future. Recent work on the problems of exercising deterrence across asymmetrical strategic contests, for example, suggests a number of problems: ‘**In asymmetric conflict situations, deterrence may not only be unable to prevent violence but may also help foment it’ (Adler 2009:103). Some of the problems arise precisely because weaker players seem increasingly likely to ‘test’ stronger players’ threats—as part of a pattern of conflict that has emerged over recent centuries, in which weaker players have often prevailed against stronger opponents.**3 If we were to look at the case study of the India–Pakistan nuclear relationship—which is grounded in an enduring strategic rivalry, and therefore not ‘typical’ of the broader nuclear relationships in Asia—it’s a moot point whether Pakistani behaviour has been much altered by the ‘deterrence’ policies of India. Indeed, the case seems to show that Pakistan doesn’t even accept a long-term condition of strategic asymmetry with India, and that it intends to use its nuclear weapons as an ‘equaliser’ against India’s larger conventional forces by building a nuclear arsenal larger than the Indian arsenal arrayed against it. That would imply, more broadly, that **increasing strategic rivalries across Asia could be accompanied by efforts to minimise asymmetrical disadvantages between a much wider range of players. In short, in a more competitive Asian strategic environment, nuclear asymmetries that are tolerable now might well become less tolerable.** Furthermore, we need to think about how we might ‘codify’ deterrence in Asia. In the Cold War days, the MAD doctrine tended to be reflected in arms control accords that limited wasteful spending and corralled the competition. As Walker acknowledges, the agreements were important ‘stabilisers’ of the broader nuclear relationship, but to what extent can they be replicated in conditions of asymmetry? It might be possible to codify crisis management procedures, but designing (and verifying) **limitations on weapons numbers would seem to be much more difficult when the arsenals are of uneven size, and when the weaker party (perhaps both parties) would probably be relying on secrecy about the numbers and locations of weapons to minimise the vulnerability** of their arsenals.

## Cap K

#### The affirmative radically depoliticizes the economy - this can never obtain the dimensions of universality because it precludes acts of authentic politics

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

**The big news of today’s post-political age** of the ‘end of ideology’ **is** thus **the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy:** the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, **as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of** religious, sexual, ethnic and other **way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made.** In short, **the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom,** the subordinated of the process of production to social control – **the radical** repoliticization of the economy.That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s **post-politics cannot attain** the properly political dimension of **universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization.** The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: **all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues** (gay rights, **ecology,** ethnic minorities…), **all this incessant activity** of fluid, shifting identities, **of building multiple** ad hoc **coalitions,** and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and **ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what** really matters **– will** not **be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized.** 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, **it is much more crucial to focus on what** remains the same **in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital.** The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### It is not possible to solve any situation without solving them all - only a criticism which attacks the universality of capitalism can solve their impacts and the inevitable destruction of the Earth and its people

**Zizek, ’89**

(Slavoj, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Studies, The Sublime Object of Ideology, page 3-4)

It is upon the unity of these two features that the Marxist notion of the revolution, of the revolutionary situation, is founded: **a situation of metaphorical condensation in which it finally becomes clear to the everyday consciousness that it is not possible to solve any particular ques­tion without** solving them all - that is, **without solving the fundamental question which embodies the antagonistic character of the social totality. In a 'normal', pre-revolutionary state of things, everybody is fighting his own particular battles** (workers are striking for better wages, feminists are fighting for the rights of women, democrats for political and social freedoms, ecologists against the exploitation of nature, participants in the peace movements against the danger of war, and so on). Marxists are using all their skill and adroimess of argument to convince the partici­pants in these particular struggles that the only real solution to their problem is to be found in the global revolution: **as long as social relations are dominated by Capital, there will always be sexism in relations between the sexes, there will always be a threat of global war, there will always be a danger that political and social freedoms will be suspended, nature itself will always remain an object of ruthless exploitation**. . . . **The global revolution will then abolish the basic social antagonism, enabling the formation of a transparent, rationally governed society.**

#### Our alternative is to completely withdraw from the ideology of capital - this is essential to destroy the fetish that allows capital to survive

**Johnston ’04** (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

Perhaps the absence of a detailed political roadmap in Žižek’s recent writings isn’t a major shortcoming. Maybe, at least for the time being, the most important task is simply the negativity of the critical struggle, the effort to cure an intellectual constipation resulting from capitalist ideology and thereby to truly open up the space for imagining authentic alternatives to the prevailing state of the situation. Another definition of materialism offered by Žižek is that it amounts to accepting the internal inherence of what fantasmatically appears as an external deadlock or hindrance ( Žižek, 2001d, pp 22–23) (with fantasy itself being defined as the false externalization of something within the subject, namely, the illusory projection of an inner obstacle, Žižek, 2000a, p 16). From this perspective, seeing through ideological fantasies by learning how to think again outside the confines of current restrictions has, in and of itself, the potential to operate as a form of real revolutionary practice (rather than remaining merely an instance of negative/critical intellectual reflection). Why is this the case? Recalling the analysis of commodity fetishism, the social efficacy of money as the universal medium of exchange (and the entire political economy grounded upon it) ultimately relies upon nothing more than a kind of ‘‘magic,’’ that is, the belief in money’s social efficacy by those using it in the processes of exchange. Since the value of currency is, at bottom, reducible to the belief that it has the value attributed to it (and that everyone believes that everyone else believes this as well), derailing capitalism by destroying its essential financial substance is, in a certain respect, as easy as dissolving the mere belief in this substance’s powers. The ‘‘external’’ obstacle of the capitalist system exists exclusively on the condition that subjects, whether consciously or unconsciously, ‘‘internally’’ believe in it – capitalism’s life-blood, money, is simply a fetishistic crystallization of a belief in others’ belief in the socio-performative force emanating from this same material. And yet, this point of capitalism’s frail vulnerability is simultaneously the source of its enormous strength: its vampiric symbiosis with individual human desire, and the fact that the late-capitalist cynic’s fetishism enables the disavowal of his/her de facto belief in capitalism, makes it highly unlikely that people can simply be persuaded to stop believing and start thinking (especially since, as Žižek claims, many of these people are convinced that they already have ceased believing). Or, the more disquieting possibility to entertain is that some people today, even if one succeeds in exposing them to the underlying logic of their position, might respond in a manner resembling that of the Judas-like character Cypher in the film The Matrix (Cypher opts to embrace enslavement by illusion rather than cope with the discomfort of dwelling in the ‘‘desert of the real’’): faced with the choice between living the capitalist lie or wrestling with certain unpleasant truths, many individuals might very well deliberately decide to accept what they know full well to be a false pseudo-reality, a deceptively comforting fiction (‘‘Capitalist commodity fetishism or the truth? I choose fetishism’’).

## Case

**Solvency**

***Uranium prices need to be 700 dollars per kilogram for reprocessing to be competitive***

**Dennis et. al 09** – Kate J. Dennis and Christopher D. Holmes are PhD candidates at Harvard University’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Kurt Z. House is the president of Cambridge-based C12 Energy. Benjamin G. Lee is a postdoctoral researcher at the National Renewable Energy Lab in Golden, Colorado. Lee T. Murray, Justin Parrella, and Jason Rugolo are PhD candidates at Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. David M. Romps is a research scientist at Harvard’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Mark T. Winkler is a PhD candidate at Harvard’s Department of Physics. The two undecideds, Jacob J. Krich and Ernst A. van Nierop, contributed to this article as well. Krich is a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Center for the Environment; van Nierop is the director of engineering at C12 Energy. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, The case against nuclear Reprocessing, DoI: 10.2968/065006003, <http://www.davidmthompson.org/2009/reprocessing/09reprocessing.pdf>, jj

**Reprocessing is not cost effective. In order for reprocessing to make sense economically, the price of a new MOX fuel rod must be competitive with the price of a new uranium fuel rod**, which largely depends on the price of mined uranium. **Several studies have concluded that the price of uranium would have to be** in the range of $400**–$700 per kilogram in order for reprocessed MOX to break even**. **But for the first half of 2009, the price of uranium oxide has hovered around $100 per kilogram.** In fact, **uranium prices have reached $300 per kilogram** (in 2008 dollars) **only twice in history**—in the late 1970s during the energy crisis and briefly in the summer of 2007. In other words, **uranium has never sustained a price that would make reprocessing profitable**. And **given the large estimated resources of uranium available at or below $130 per kilogram, it is unlikely that reprocessing will become cost competitive any time in the foreseeable future**. **The high expense of reprocessing is rooted in the fact that chemically separating and processing spent nuclear fuel requires large, complex facilities that produce significant quantities of radioactive and chemical wastes**. **These facilities also must meet modern health and safety standards for dealing with highly toxic plutonium, which adds to the expense**. **In addition, these facilities produce weaponsusable plutonium and must be operated under military guard, which adds more costs to the process**. At the same time, **it is difficult to recoup all of these expenses when reprocessing yields so little usable product—only one MOX fuel rod is produced for every seven spent uranium fuel rods reprocessed**. That means, **for all of the investment and operating costs, reprocessing boosts the usable energy extracted from mined uranium only about 14 percent.**

***Reprocessing doesn’t solve waste***

**Bunn 05** – Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project. Written Testimony The Case Against a Near-Term Decision to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BUNN FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 16, 2005, <http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/3273/case_against_a_nearterm_decision_to_reprocess_spent_nuclear_fuel_in_the_united_states.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F368%2Fmatthew_bunn%3Fgroupby%3D0%26hide%3D1%26id%3D368%26back_url%3D%25252Fexperts%25252F%26%253Bback_text%3DBack%252Bto%252Blist%252Bof%252Bexperts%26filter%3D2005>, jj

First, **reprocessing** by itself **does not make any of the nuclear waste go away**. **Whatever course we choose, we will still need a nuclear waste repository such as Yucca Mountain**. **Reprocessing is simply a chemical process that separates the radioactive materials in spent fuel into different components**. In the traditional process, known as PUREX, reprocessing produces separated plutonium (which is weapons-usable), recovered uranium, and high-level waste (containing all the other transuranic elements and fission products). **In the process, intermediate and low-level wastes are also generated**. **More advanced processes now being examined**, such as UREX+ and pyroprocessing, attempt to address some of the problems of the PUREX process, **but whether they will do so successfully remains to be seen**. Once the spent fuel has been reprocessed, the plutonium and uranium separated from the spent fuel can in principle be recycled into new fuel; in the more advanced processes, some other long-lived species would also be irradiated in reactors (or accelerator-driven assemblies) to transmute them into shorter-lived species.

### Prolif

***No reprocessing renaissance now --- countries are opting for a once-through cycle***

**Yudin 09**—Yury Yudin, UNIDIR/2009/4, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals <http://unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf2-act439.pdf>, jj

Since the beginning of this century, international attention has been increasingly focused on multilateral approaches to the front end (uranium enrichment) of the nuclear fuel cycle (see Annex A for an explanation of the fuel cycle). **A global “plutonium economy” is still out of sight and, in spite of some revival of interest in the closed nuclear cycle and recycling of plutonium, for the next few decades the once-through nuclear fuel cycle without the reprocessing of spent fuel seems to be the option of choice for the majority of countries for economic and technical reasons**. **Most countries have already decided to adopt interim storage instead of reprocessing their spent power-reactor fuel**, at least as a medium-term alternative, **and there are no immediate expectations for new reprocessing plants or a growing demand for reprocessing services in the world.**

***Reprocessing down globally --- proves the US moratorium has been effective***

**Lyman & Hippel 08**—Edwin Lyman is a senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program. Frank N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. April 2008, Arms Control Association, Reprocessing Revisited:The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/LymanVonHippel>, jj

Radioactive Waste Politics and **the Rise and Fall of Civilian Reprocessing Abroad**

In the 1970s, nuclear utilities in Western Europe and Japan found a temporary fix for their waste problems by shipping spent fuel for reprocessing in France and the United Kingdom, which had originally built reprocessing plants to produce plutonium for their weapons programs. In parallel, the Soviet Union took back spent fuel from Eastern European countries that it had supplied with fresh fuel and reprocessed some of it.

States that shipped spent fuel to the Soviet Union were able to get rid of it forever. States that shipped to France and the United Kingdom obtained only a temporary respite from their disposal problem. Domestic politics made it impossible for France or the United Kingdom to keep the radioactive waste generated from their reprocessing of foreign spent fuel. They therefore required that the separated plutonium and the concentrated high-level waste from reprocessing be shipped back to the country of origin. This meant that the customer countries had to locate and build high-level radioactive waste and plutonium storage facilities even after paying reprocessing charges 10 times larger than it would have cost simply to store the spent fuel. Recently, Russia has adopted the same policy of shipping high-level waste back to its foreign reprocessing customers.

As a result, **13 of the 14 customer countries that made reprocessing a source of foreign exchange for France, Russia, and the United Kingdom have decided not to renew their reprocessing contracts**.[6] **Twelve have decided on interim storage of their spent fuel**. The thirteenth, Japan, has built its own $20 billion reprocessing facility. Japan justifies this costly decision by arguing that, otherwise, with no way to ship spent fuel from its nuclear power plant sites, it would have had to shut them all down.[7]

**Given the loss of all of its foreign customers, the United Kingdom plans to shut down its reprocessing plants**.[8] After this, only China, France, India, Japan, and Russia will operate reprocessing facilities. **China does not have an operating reprocessing plant today**, but it is building a pilot reprocessing plant and is negotiating with France to purchase a full-scale plant.[9] **Belgium, Germany, and Italy have shut down their pilot-scale reprocessing plants.**

Thus, **three decades after the United States adopted an anti-reprocessing policy, one nuclear-weapon state is quitting,** another is starting, **three non-nuclear-weapon states have quit, and 12 non-nuclear-weapon states that were having their spent fuel reprocessed abroad have quit or will quit soon.** Japan, which had completed a pilot reprocessing plant in 1974 before the United States reversed its pro-reprocessing policy, remains the only non-nuclear-weapon state that reprocesses. Its reprocessing program has been a major source of suspicion and envy in South Korea.

***Reprocessing causes prolif --- not resistant and comparatively more dangerous than disposal***

**Bunn 05** –Written Testimony The Case Against a Near-Term Decision to Reprocess Spent Nuclear Fuel in the United States TESTIMONY OF MATTHEW BUNN FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERGY COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JUNE 16, 2005, <http://live.belfercenter.org/publication/3273/case_against_a_nearterm_decision_to_reprocess_spent_nuclear_fuel_in_the_united_states.html?breadcrumb=%2Fexperts%2F368%2Fmatthew_bunn%3Fgroupby%3D0%26hide%3D1%26id%3D368%26back_url%3D%25252Fexperts%25252F%26%253Bback_text%3DBack%252Bto%252Blist%252Bof%252Bexperts%26filter%3D2005>, jj

**Unnecessary proliferation risks**

Third, traditional approaches to **reprocessing and recycling pose significant and unnecessary proliferation risks, and even proposed new approaches are not as proliferation-resistant as they should be**. **It is crucial to understand that any state or group that could make a bomb from weapon-grade plutonium could make a bomb from the reactor-grade plutonium separated by reprocessing**. Despite the remarkable progress of safeguards and security technology over the last few decades, **processing**, fabricating, and transporting tons of weapons-usable separated plutonium every year — when even a few kilograms is enough for a bomb — **inevitably raises greater risks than not doing so**. **The dangers** posed by these operations can be reduced with sufficient investment in security and safeguards, but **they cannot be reduced to zero, and these additional risks are unnecessary.**

Indeed, **contrary to the assertion** in the Energy and Water appropriations subcommittee report **that plutonium reprocessing in other countries poses little risk because the plutonium is immediately recycled as fresh fuel — a conclusion that would not be correct even if the underlying assertion were true — the fact is that** **reprocessing is far outpacing the use of the resulting plutonium as fuel, with the result that over 240 tons of separated, weapons-usable civilian plutonium now exists in the world, a figure that will soon surpass the amount of plutonium in all the world’s nuclear weapons arsenals combined**. The British Royal Society, in a 1998 report, warned that even in an advanced industrial state like the United Kingdom, **the possibility that plutonium stocks might be "accessed for illicit weapons production is of extreme concern."**

Moreover, **a near-term U.S. return to reprocessing could significantly undermine broader U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies**. President Bush has announced an effort to convince countries around the world to forego reprocessing and enrichment capabilities of their own; has continued the efforts of past administrations to convince other states to avoid the further accumulation of separated plutonium, because of the proliferation hazards it poses; and has continued to press states in regions of proliferation concern not to reprocess (including not only states such as North Korea and Iran, but also U.S. allies such South Korea and Taiwan, both of which had secret nuclear weapons programs closely associated with reprocessing efforts in the past). **A U.S. decision to move toward reprocessing itself would make it more difficult to convince other states not to do the same.**

**Advocates argue that the more advanced approaches now being pursued would be more proliferation-resistant**. Technologies such as pyroprocessing are undoubtedly better than PUREX in this respect. **But the plutonium-bearing materials that would be separated in either the UREX+ process or by pyroprocessing would not be radioactive enough to meet international standards for being "self-protecting" against possible theft.**8 Moreover, **if these technologies were deployed widely in the developing world, where most of the future growth in electricity demand will be, this would contribute to potential proliferating states building up expertise, real-world experience, and facilities that could be readily turned to support a weapons program.**

Proponents of reprocessing and recycling often argue that this approach will provide a nonproliferation benefit, by consuming the plutonium in spent fuel, which would otherwise turn geologic repositories into potential plutonium mines in the long term. But **the proliferation risk posed by spent fuel buried in a safeguarded repository is already modest; if the world could be brought to a state in which such repositories were the most significant remaining proliferation risk, that would be cause for great celebration**. Moreover, **this risk will be occurring a century or more from now**, and if there is one thing we know about the nuclear world a century hence, it is that its shape and contours are highly uncertain. **We should not increase significant proliferation risks in the near term in order to reduce already small and highly uncertain proliferation risks in the distant future.**

***One-through fuel cycle checks nuclear terrorism --- reprocessing reverses***

**UCS 11** – Union of Concerned Scientists (“Reprocessing and Nuclear Terrorism,” March 21, <http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_power/nuclear_power_risk/nuclear_proliferation_and_terrorism/reprocessing-and-nuclear.html>)

**Over three decades ago, the United States decided on nuclear non-proliferation grounds not to reprocess the spent fuel generated by civilian nuclear power plants**, but instead to directly dispose of it in a geologic repository. However, the United States does not yet have a geologic repository and policymakers periodically propose that the United States begin to reprocess its spent fuel. **Reprocessing existing U.S. spent fuel would produce hundreds of tons of separated plutonium that would be vulnerable to diversion or theft by terrorists.**

***Reprocessing would increase the risk of nuclear terrorism***

**From the perspective of terrorists seeking a nuclear weapon, reprocessing changes plutonium from a form in which it is highly radioactive and nearly impossible to steal to one in which it is not radioactive and could be stolen surreptitiously by an insider, or taken by force during its routine transportation.**

This situation is made worse by the fact that **the theft of enough plutonium to build several nuclear weapons could remain undetected for many years at a reprocessing facility**. In particular, at commercial scale "bulk-handling" reprocessing facilities and fuel fabrication plants, which annually handle from several tons to many tens of tons of separated plutonium in solution or powder form, **it is essentially impossible to account for the plutonium throughput to within tens or even hundreds of kilograms in a timely manner, making it feasible that the theft of this quantity of plutonium could go undetected for many years**. **Since a relatively simple implosion nuclear weapon can be made with roughly six kilograms of plutonium, the uncertainty in the annual amount of plutonium processed is quite significant, and could lead to undetected acquisition of weapon-usable materials by states or terrorists.**

**This is not just a theoretical problem: two striking examples have occurred in Japan**. In 1994, it was revealed that over five years of operation, the total amount of plutonium unaccounted for at the Plutonium Fuel Production Facility in Tokai-mura had grown to seventy kilograms—enough for some 11 nuclear weapons. Ultimately, in 1996 it was determined that most of the missing material was in dust that accumulated on the equipment inside the facility. Had the material instead been stolen, the theft would have remained undetected for years—more than enough time for terrorists to convert the material into crude nuclear weapons.

Similar problems occurred at the reprocessing plant in Tokai-mura, which started operation in 1977. Japanese officials acknowledged in January 2003 that it took a 15-year investigation to account for a more than 200-kilogram shortfall in plutonium at the reprocessing plant. This amount constitutes about three percent of the total amount of plutonium separated by the plant during 25 years of operation, and is enough for some thirty nuclear weapons.

**In contrast, in a "once-through" nuclear fuel cycle, the spent fuel is left intact and simply stored once it is removed from the reactor, for ultimate disposal in a repository**. **In this case the plutonium remains imbedded in the highly radioactive spent fuel, which is thus "self-protected" from theft**. **Since anyone within a meter of spent fuel that was less than 50 years old would receive a deadly dose in less than 30 minutes, even terrorists willing to die for their cause would not have enough time to do anything useful.**

Of course, **the size and weight of the spent fuel assemblies** (**typically 10 feet long, and fifteen hundred pounds) also makes them difficult to steal. Moreover, it is straightforward to account for the number of fuel assemblies.**

In sum, **a closed nuclear fuel cycle entails the handling and transportation of large amounts of nuclear bomb-making material**. As discussed above, during much of this process, **the material cannot be accounted for precisely enough to ensure that an amount adequate for one or more nuclear weapons has not been stolen. This situation presents numerous opportunities for terrorists to acquire the material they need to build a nuclear weapon.**

**We will be much safer if plutonium remains within the highly radioactive spent fuel that is eventually sealed in a secure geologic repository than if plutonium is extracted from spent fuel, fabricated into fresh fuel, and shipped to nuclear reactors around the country, where it would be vulnerable to diversion or theft at every stage.**

***They don’t solve the motivation for prolif***

**Friedman ‘12**

George Friedman, 9-11-12, STRATFOR, War and Bluff: Iran, Israel and the United States <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/war-and-bluff-iran-israel-and-united-states?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120911&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=title&elq=a8288f444a084a1bad25aa86615854c0>, jj

**From the Iranian point of view, a nuclear program has been extremely valuable**. **Having one has brought Iran prestige in the Islamic world and has given it a level of useful global political credibility.** As with North Korea, **having a nuclear program has allowed Iran to sit as an equal with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, creating a psychological atmosphere in which Iran's willingness merely to talk to the Americans, British, French, Russians, Chinese and Germans represented a concession**. Though it has positioned the Iranians extremely well politically, the nuclear program also has triggered sanctions that have caused Iran substantial pain. But **Iran has prepared for sanctions for years, building a range of corporate, banking and security mechanisms to evade their most devastating impact. Having countries like Russia and China unwilling to see Iran crushed has helped. *Iran can survive sanctions.***

***Mid East prolif is slow***

**Riedel & Samore, 2008** [Bruce and Gary, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution;vice president, director of studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg chair at the Council on Foreign Relations**,** CFR, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.”]

Most recently, Syria’s efforts to build a secret research reactor with North Korean assistance—as a counter to Israel’s nuclear capabilities— were abruptly terminated by an Israeli air raid in September 2007. Even though a number of Arab states have announced plans to revive or initiate nuclear power programs, none of these states has the scientific and industrial infrastructure or the skilled human capital to advance quickly, even with a crash program. Moreover, none of the established nuclear suppliers is prepared to export fuel-cycle technology or facilities to the region. In these circumstances, the only near-term option for an Arab country is to seek to purchase nuclear material or weapons from another state. At least one state probably has already set the diplomatic basis for doing so: Saudi Arabia with Pakistan.

***Middle East prolif doesn’t cause nuclear war***

**Rijpkema ‘10**(Marisa Kushner, B.A. – Government, Strategy, Diplomacy, George Washington University November, “Should Israel Alter its Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity?” proquest, jj)

Furthermore, some experts assert **that a nuclearized Middle East would not necessarily become the location of the world’s first nuclear war**. This is based on the viewpoint **that there is a vast gap between the language used by Middle Eastern leaders, which often incorporates extreme rhetoric, and their actual behavior. As such, there is no clear indication that Arab leaders are irrational or would use nuclear weapons on a whim, and it possible that Arab leaders would remain sensitive to the costs of using nuclear weapons.**102

### Relations

#### US Russia relations up --- their ev ignores day-to-day cooperation

Morrison 3/5/13, James Morrison joined the The Washington Times in 1983 as a local reporter covering Alexandria, Va. A year later, he was assigned to open a Times bureau in Canada. From 1987 to 1989, Mr. Morrison was The Washington Times reporter in London, covering Britain, Western Europe and NATO issues. After returning to Washington, he served as an assistant foreign editor until his transfer to the Metro desk as the Virginia editor. Mr. Morrison returned to the Foreign Desk in 1993 to launch the Embassy Row column, a diplomatic news column primarily focusing on foreign ambassadors in the United States and U.S. ambassadors abroad. The column is the only one of its kind in U.S. journalism. Mr. Morrison was born on Nov. 27, 1950, in Charleston, W.Va. His father worked as a printer for the Charleston Gazette and later relocated to Washington to work as a photo engraver at The Washington Post until his retirement. Before joining The Washington Times, James Morrison was a reporter for the Springfield, Va., Times, the Northern Virginia Sun and the Alexandria Gazette. He attended American University. 3/5/13, Embassy Row: Russia reset again, <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/mar/5/embassy-row-russia-reset-again/?page=all#pagebreak>, jj

The U.S. ambassador to Russia insists that Washington and Moscow are actually quite close, despite the news media’s focus on their bitter disputes.

“If you only listened to some of the loudest rhetoric on U.S.-Russian relations, you might get the impression that Americans and Russians only argue and never work together,” Ambassador Michael McFaul wrote on the U.S. Embassy’s website.

“Yet, these instances of differences between us seem to get the bulk of the attention, while the quiet, everyday — yet vitally important — spheres of cooperation go unnoticed.”

Mr. McFaul listed 28 areas of U.S.-Russian teamwork. He posted one on his Twitter account every day in February — the shortest month of the year.

#### Kerry’s visit will smooth out any wrinkles in relations

China Daily 2/5/13, Visits may improve US-Russia relations, <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2013-02/05/content_16200592.htm>, jj

US Secretary of State John Kerry may visit Russia soon as Washington and Moscow are trying to mend their strained ties.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov also told reporters on Saturday that US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon also plans to visit Moscow, "probably this month", according to the RIA Novosti.

Analysts said the visits may give the US and Russia a chance to ease tensions that have flared up in recent months by disagreements over a series of issues including Syria.

Both countries have also taken tit-for-tat measures after the US passed a law in December that bars entry into the US for Russians who are deemed to be human rights abusers. In response, Russia passed a law that includes a ban on the adoption of Russian children by US citizens.

Russian President Vladimir Putin skipped the G8 summit hosted by the US in May, which analysts have said was largely due to their disagreement on anti-ballistic missile issues.

Kerry, sworn in on Friday, acknowledged to a Senate panel in January that US-Russia relations "slid backwards in recent years", saying the US must find a way to work with Russia, RIA Novosti reported.

He mentioned several areas where Russia has cooperated with the US including nuclear arms control, sanctions on Iran and trade, and said he would like to find a way to cooperate with Russia on ending the civil war in Syria.

On the sidelines of the 49th Munich Security Conference on Saturday in Germany, Lavrov met with US Vice-President Joseph Biden in "quite an informal and friendly atmosphere", the Voice of Russia reported.

Their meeting is the first high-level contact between the two countries since US President Barack Obama was re-elected in November.

It "appears to have revived the spirit of the 'reset'" of their relations, which Biden had proclaimed in Munich four years ago, according to India's The Hindu newspaper.

During former Russian president Dmitry Medvedev's term, the relationship between the two major powers improved with high-level visits and the signing of a series of cooperation deals.

Setting out Russia's policy agenda for 2013 at an annual news conference last month, Lavrov made clear that improving relations with Washington was part of Moscow's vision for strengthening its influence on the world stage, Reuters reported.

***Relations inevitable – desire for prestige***

Shoumikhin et. al. 2009 (Andrei Shoumikhin, Ph.D., is Senior Analyst at the National Institute for Public Policy. Baker Spring is F. M. Kirby Research Fellow in National Security Policy in the Douglas and Sarah Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies, a division of the Kathryn and Shelby Cullom Davis Institute for International Studies, at The Heritage Foundation.” Strategic Nuclear Arms Control for the Protect and Defend Strategy,” 5-4, <http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/bg2266.cfm>)

**Strategic relations between the United States and the Russian Federation are of paramount impor­tance for the Russian leadership,** just as they were for Soviet leaders.[[17]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn17%22%20%5Co%20%22) **From Moscow's perspective, they symbolize the equivalence of the geostrategic potentials of the two powers that have the largest nuclear arsenals**. As former Russian President and current Prime Minister Putin has noted: Russia and the United States are the biggest nuclear powers. Our economy might be smaller, but Russia's nuclear potential is still comparable to that of the United States.… It is also important that we have the years of experience, the technology and the production potential, the technological chains and the specialists. Russia is a great nuclear power. No one disputes or doubts this. And **the United States and Russia definitely have a shared interest in ensuring security on this planet**.[[18]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy%22%20%5Cl%20%22_ftn18%22%20%5Co%20%22) After the loss of the former Soviet Union's super­power status, Russia has worked diligently to rees­tablish its influence in Eurasia, the Middle East, and even Latin America. While this lost status hurts the Russian pride, it also allows Moscow to blame the U.S. for any problems in international relations. On behalf of Russia, Putin officially asserted that "the stagnation in disarmament…has not come about through any fault of ours."[[19]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy#_ftn19) At the same time, Rus­sian leaders have never missed an opportunity to praise the virtue of and their adherence to the remaining regimes and treaties. This is not because of some abstract devotion to so-called international legality[[20]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy#_ftn20) or infinite trust in treaty obligations, but because these treaties were usually seen as an effec­tive way of preventing the U.S. and other powers from gaining superiority over Russia in advanced weapon systems. In fact, Moscow has demonstrated its readiness to abandon treaty obligations that fail to serve Russian interests.[[21]](http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2009/05/Strategic-Nuclear-Arms-Control-for-the-Protect-and-Defend-Strategy#_ftn21)

***Russia won’t cooperate with the US on the fuel cycle --- they want exclusive market leadership***

**Medetsky 10**—Anatoly Medetsky is a business reporter at The Moscow Times. He joined the paper in 2003 and started out writing for the news desk about human rights and politics in Russia and former Soviet republics. One memorable moment from Anatoly's time at the paper was watching — from the top of a police truck engulfed by protesters in Ukraine — a nighttime standoff between the crowd and special forces guarding the presidential office in Kiev during the Orange Revolution. 8-24-10, The Moscow Times, Aiming to Capitalize On Fast Reactors, <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/business/article/aiming-to-capitalize-on-fast-reactors/413514.html>, jj

"I would say **Russia is certainly the leader in fast reactor technology**," said Michael Driscoll, professor emeritus of nuclear engineering at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. "Second, I would say, is France." Some of the 26 reactors that Rosatom, the state nuclear corporation, plans to build before 2030 will use the new technology, corporation spokesman Sergei Novikov said. According to the corporation's outlook, it will completely phase out the current, third-generation equipment by the start of next century. Medvedev's prioritization of the technology last year assured the project a guarantee of receiving sufficient federal spending amid Russia's uneasy recovery from the global economic crisis. The government has allocated 110.4 billion rubles ($3.6 billion) for research in this and other nuclear energy areas until 2020 under the New Generation Nuclear Technologies program adopted in February. Gaining More Fuel It was the fear that uranium supplies would dry up very soon that pushed the creation of the first fast breeder reactors in the middle of last century. The technology received only lukewarm attention after a great deal of uranium discoveries made the ore widely available worldwide. Now the concerns have resurfaced. Rosatom is making an effort to commercialize the fast breeder reactor because, Novikov said, the world is set to run out of affordable uranium in at least 12 years, given the plans by Russia, China, India and other countries to build more reactors. "If all the plans … are implemented — and they are getting to it so far — the market will have a shortage both of uranium and the facilities for its enrichment,” he said. Uranium already shot up in price from at least $7 a pound in 2005 to $60 a pound as of June 30 for long-term contracts, Novikov said. The world may run out of uranium resources completely by the turn of the next century if there's no replacement for the current technology, said Andrei Mikshes, an industry analyst at the Natural Monopolies Institute, a think tank. The fast breeder reactor achieves what industry insiders call a closed fuel cycle, the ability to use byproducts from one nuclear reaction as fuel for another, allowing for a spectacular expansion of fuel reserves. It usually uses mixed oxide fuel made up of about 20 percent plutonium and 80 percent plain, unenriched uranium that transmutes into more plutonium as it burns. The uranium's fast neutrons hit a so-called blanket of uranium-filled tubes around the reactor core, and the interaction converts the uranium in the tubes into plutonium, thus breeding more fuel. Also, such reactors use specific kinds of uranium atoms — or isotopes — that exist in abundance in uranium ore, a change that increases the resource base for energy generation. Typical fission reactors use uranium-235, a fuel that constitutes less than 1 percent of uranium ore, which must be enriched in order to be used in existing reactors. Traditionally, uranium-238, which constitutes much of the uranium ore, has been unusable, but the fast breeder reactor would allow for its conversion to plutonium, thus making it reusable as a nuclear fuel. "At some point, you won't want to throw away the uranium … down a hole or into a permanent storage site because it's still useful fuel," said Francis Slakey, a professor of physics at Georgetown University. "And it's the fast reactors that allow you to use the fuel." Nevertheless, not everyone is convinced of a coming uranium shortage. MIT's Driscoll said the prospect that uranium would remain available at a "reasonable" cost for the rest of the century looked very good, citing a recent study by the International Atomic Energy Agency. Other countries will not be in a hurry to embrace the new technology immediately, he said. "There'll be a few of them, but I don't think it'll be displacing a lot of light water reactors," he said about the next generation reactors. "I think it's an insurance policy." But he conceded, "In the long term, we definitely should have these machines available because uranium will be perhaps like oil and, in that, it is not going to be low cost forever." In addition to a better fuel situation, the fast breeder reactor produces waste that is much safer to store because half of its radioactivity dissipates over 30 to 40 years. In contrast, waste from current nuclear reactors can take more than 25,000 years to decay. On the other hand, Alexander Nikitin, Russia director of Norwegian environmental group Bellona, said too little information was available to the public about the operational safety of these machines. Tapping the Foreign Market **In pursuing the technology's development, Russia may hope to market the design internationally before everyone else does**, Slakey said. "They may see that there's an inevitable market for the fast reactor, and **they want to get ahead of where the other competitors are**," he said. "**So it may be a business decision on the part of Russia."**

#### Zero risk of war

David E. Hoffman 10/22/12, contributing editor to Foreign Policy and the author of The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its Dangerous Legacy, which won the 2010 Pulitzer Prize for general non-fiction, "Hey, Big Spender," Foreign Policy, www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/22/hey\_big\_spender?page=full

Despite tensions that flare up, the United States and Russia are no longer enemies; **the chance of nuclear war or surprise attack is nearly zero**. We trade in each other's equity markets. Russia has the largest audience of Facebook users in Europe, and is open to the world in a way the Soviet Union never was.

#### Russia’s economy is great now

Aslund 12/28 Anders Åslund is senior fellow at the Peterson Institute for International Economics. Foreign Policy, DECEMBER 28, 2012, You're a Mean One, Mr. Putin, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/12/28/Putin_orphans_Russia_crackdown>, jj

Paradoxically, Russia is doing very well economically. The wealth in Moscow is just astounding, not only with its 100 billionaires but also a vast middle class. Macroeconomic data are stellar. The consensus expected 2012 growth rate is 3.6 percent, while neighboring Europe is mired in recession. Russia has a budget surplus and almost no public debt, a huge current account surplus, and bulging international currency reserves. Admittedly, Russia thrives on large energy exports, but oil prices are high and likely to stay there.

***Russian nukes and fissile material safe – CTR, security, detection***

**Tobey, 10/19**/12 (William, senior fellow at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a deputy administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration from 2006-2009, “Boost Phase,” http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/10/19/boost\_phase, bgm)

**The CTR Agreement was conceived and implemented in a very different time**. The Soviet Union had disintegrated and Russia was financially supine. U.S. assistance was necessary to keep body and soul together for Russian nuclear weapons scientists, and to remove the temptation for them to sell their knowledge and wares to other nations or terrorists. In the absence of Soviet oppression, **the Russian nuclear archipelago was a security nightmare, with fallen fences, crumbling buildings, poor procedures, and a demoralized (and all too often drunken) guard force**. Championed by Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar, and signed by President George H. W. Bush, **the** **C**ooperative **T**hreat **R**eduction legislation **created programs to detect, secure, and dispose of dangerous nuclear material in Russia and the former Soviet Union, as well as to facilitate the destruction of missiles and chemical weapons.** **Today, Russia is more prosperous and its nuclear weapons, materials, and facilities are much more secure**. **Work under the Bratislava Initiative**, agreed to by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin in 2005, **essentially completed physical security upgrades at nuclear weapons facilities in Russia**. **Fissile material production** reactors at Seversk and Zheleznogorsk **were shut down and replaced with coal-fired plants. Hundreds of Russian ports, airports, and border crossings are now equipped with nuclear detection equipment.** **Over 400 metric tons of Russian highly enriched uranium has been down-blended to fuel reactors that now provide 10 percent of American electricity**. **Nuclear weapons in Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus have been removed to Russia, and the former Soviet nuclear test site at Degelen Mountain in Kazakhstan has been secured from scavengers**. **Moscow and Washington**, among others, **should be proud of these signal achievements**.

#### Squo solves terror

**STRATFOR 1-16-12** (Jihadism in 2012: A Persistent, Low-Level Threat, <http://www.stratfor.com/analysis/jihadism-2012-persistent-low-level-threat>, jj)

Conclusion

While **the al Qaeda core has been marginalized and heavily damaged**, the ideology of **jihadism** continues to survive and **win new converts**, albeit **at progressively lower numbers**. As long as this ideology is able to spread, the war its adherents are waging will continue. While **jihadists do not pose a strategic geopolitical threat on a global, regional or national scale**, they nonetheless are capable of killing scores of people. For that reason alone, the jihadist threat remains in 2012.

# 2nc

## DA

**2nc Impact Overview**

***Disad outweighs on timeframe --- their tech won’t come online for decades, but basic research is sufficient to trigger our prolif impacts***

India proves plan has a long timeframe --- they immediately built a nuclear arsenal after researching reprocessing and breeder reactors in the 70s, but a demonstration reactor is finally being built now --- it will take till 2050 for the plan’s tech to work, but South Korea could exploit prototype tech and expertise gained from R & D to have nukes within years --- it will be fast and secret

**Hippel 10**—Frank N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University and co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). During 1993-1994, he was assistant director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. PLUTONIUM, PROLIFERATION, AND RADIOACTIVE-WASTE POLITICS IN EAST ASIA, Feb 17, 2010, <http://www.npolicy.org/userfiles/file/hapter%204.pdf>, jj

**It is the proliferation implications**, however, **that make this an issue of international concern**. **Although it would take a long time to deploy the pyroprocessing and fast reactor capacity** required to keep up with the rate of discharge of transuranics in South Korea’s PWR spent fuel, ***even the engineering prototype pyroprocessing plant*** that KAERI hopes to bring online in 2016 ***would be of proliferation concern***. **It would be able to separate 100 kg of plutonium, or enough for more than 10 nuclear bombs per year**. KAERI argues pyroprocessing’s “proliferation resistance has been internationally recognized due to the impossibility to recover plutonium.” 41 The U.S. Department of Energy did, in fact, promote the “proliferation-resistance” of pyroprocessing during the George Bush Administration. A 2009 interlaboratory review reported, however, the results of an: assessment [that] focuses on determining whether three alternative reprocessing technologies—COEX, UREX+, and pyroprocessing—provide nonproliferation advantages relative to the PUREX technology because they do not produce separated plutonium. [**We] found only a modest improvement in reducing proliferation risk over existing PUREX technologies and these modest improvements apply primarily for nonstate actors**. **42 KAERI therefore would be creating a nuclearweapon option for South Korea in 2016, while its proposed costly approach might begin reducing the transuranics in South Korea’s spent nuclear fuel after 2050**. **India followed this path and implemented its nuclear-weapon option in 1974. Only now, more than 35 years later, is India building its first demonstration breeder reactor, which may or may not work. South Korea may not today have any more intention than Japan to actually exploit a nuclear-weapon option, but, if a future government wished, it could do so quickly and secretly within weeks before domestic or international opposition could stop it.**

***Turns the whole prolif leadership advantage and causes an arms race***

**Hippel 10** (Frank N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University and co-chair of the International Panel on Fissile Materials (IPFM). During 1993-1994, he was assistant director for national security in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy. He would like to acknowledge Dr. Jungmin Kang’s generosity in providing the Korean citations for this article. This article was prepared with support from the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center and the IPFM. March 2010, Arms Control Association, South Korean Reprocessing: An Unnecessary Threat to the Nonproliferation Regime <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2010_03/VonHippel>, jj)

**South Korea is contemplating a decision that could have critical implications for the future of the international nonproliferation regime: whether to reprocess its spent fuel**. Driven by a combination of factors—local government resistance to extended spent fuel storage at its nuclear power plants, irritation that the United States has consented to spent fuel reprocessing in Japan but not South Korea, and alarm over North Korea’s nuclear weapons program—much of South Korea’s nuclear establishment wants to do so.

Japan is the only non-nuclear-weapon state today that reprocesses or attempts to do so.[1] Reprocessing makes no sense economically, and contrary to the claims of its advocates, it complicates radioactive waste disposal. Japan’s utilities argue, however, that they have no choice; local governments will not allow extended on-site spent fuel storage, and no state prefecture (Japan’s equivalent of a state) is willing to host an interim storage facility for fear that interim will become permanent.[2]

Given the U.S. inability to site either a geological repository or a central interim spent fuel storage facility, there should be some sympathy in the United States for the plight of the nuclear utilities in South Korea and Japan. Yet, the United States has another option once the spent fuel storage pools at its power reactors become full: dry-cask storage of the older, cooler spent fuel next to the reactors. Japan’s and South Korea’s nuclear utilities claim that they do not have that option because local governments are not allowing them to build on-site dry-cask storage.

**Reprocessing creates huge flows and stockpiles of separated plutonium**. Japan’s reprocessing plant in full operation will separate enough plutonium to make 1,000 nuclear bombs annually. South Korea’s nuclear establishment proposes not to separate the plutonium completely from other transuranic elements,[3] but the final separation step would be relatively trivial.

Many Chinese and South Korean security analysts are deeply suspicious of Japan’s motives for reprocessing. Some Japanese security analysts acknowledge privately that it provides Japan with a quick nuclear-weapon option, even if Japan does not intend to use that option for the foreseeable future.[4] China, Japan, and North Korea similarly would be deeply suspicious of a decision by South Korea to reprocess.

The United States consented to Japan’s reprocessing program during the Carter administration only after the issue had escalated to the point where Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda was stating publicly that the right to reprocess was “a life or death issue for Japan.”[5] The trauma of the 1973 Arab oil embargo was still a fresh memory, and it is likely that the prime minister had been convinced by Japan’s nuclear energy establishment that a rapid transition to plutonium breeder reactors, which require reprocessing, would free Japan from a similar dependence on imported uranium. Demonstration breeder reactors proved to be costly and unreliable, however, and their commercialization has receded into the future.[6]

Today the rhetoric around reprocessing is escalating in South Korea. Following North Korea’s nuclear test in May 2009, the political opposition demanded that South Korea have “nuclear sovereignty,” i.e., the same rights as Japan.[7]

The 1974 U.S.-South Korean nuclear cooperation agreement requires U.S. consent if “any irradiated fuel elements containing fuel material received from the United States of America [are to be] altered in form or content.”[8] As a matter of policy, South Korea requests that the United States agree to such activities even if U.S.-origin material is not involved.[9] The cooperation agreement will expire in 2014, however, and South Korea wants to negotiate a new agreement that will give it the same programmatic permission that the United States has given the European Union, Japan, Switzerland, and, with certain conditions, India.[10]

South Korea’s government-supported Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI) has launched a campaign to try to convince the Obama administration and the U.S. nongovernmental nonproliferation community to agree to this proposal. At the end of January 2010, the U.S. government responded to high-level South Korean lobbying on this issue by agreeing with South Korean Vice Foreign Minister Chun Yung-woo to what he described as “a technological and economical feasibility study by experts on pyro-processing prior to the negotiations on revising” the 1974 nuclear cooperation agreement.[11] Pyroprocessing is the variant of reprocessing that South Korea is pursuing.

**If the U.S. government and nonproliferation community accept South Korea’s need to reprocess, however, it will become difficult to resist the same demand from additional countries**. **South Africa**, for example, also **has expressed an interest in reprocessing**.[12] One of its nuclear officials has described reprocessing as “an element of contemporary power relations.”[13]

**Implementation of pyroprocessing in South Korea would be inconsistent with its 1992 joint declaration with North Korea on the denuclearization of the Korean peninsula**. **Under this agreement, the two countries agreed not to “possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities**.”[14] Pyroprocessing advocates in South Korea point out that North Korea has repeatedly broken the 1992 agreement and argue that there is little hope that North Korea will denuclearize any time in the foreseeable future**. If South Korea were to launch a pyroprocessing program, however, it would at best further complicate efforts to persuade North Korea to carry through on the commitment it made in 2005 to end its nuclear program**.[15] At worst, ***it could lead to a nuclear arms race between South and North.***

Concerns that **South Korea’s interest in reprocessing could destabilize the nonproliferation regime** should stimulate China, Japan, Russia, South Korea, and the United States—the countries that, along with North Korea, are the participants in the six-party talks on Pyongyang’s nuclear program—to discuss alternatives to a proliferation of national reprocessing plants. **The U.S. government must also resist demands from** some congressional **Republicans that spent fuel reprocessing be part of any U.S. program to deal with climate change**.[16] The fact that the United States has not reprocessed its own spent power-reactor fuel since 1972 has been critical to its ability to persuade non-nuclear-weapon states that they do not need to reprocess either. When Presidents Gerald Ford and Jimmy Carter reversed the position of previous administrations and decided to forgo reprocessing at home and discourage it abroad, Belgium, Germany, Italy, and Taiwan had pilot reprocessing plants.[17] Argentina was building a plant,[18] and France and Germany were contracting to sell reprocessing plants to South Korea and Brazil, respectively.[19] Many of these plans were originally launched out of interest in acquiring at least a nuclear weapons option.

The administration of George W. Bush proposed that the United States could build a reprocessing plant without encouraging the spread of such plants if the United States and other countries that currently reprocess offered reprocessing services to the non-nuclear-weapon states. France, Russia, and the United Kingdom already have tried that, however, and it failed because of the cost and the unwillingness of the reprocessing countries to keep the reprocessing waste.[20]

**The proliferation problems that reprocessing creates are a powerful argument against it**. That argument is strengthened by the failure of reprocessing to solve the spent fuel problem. The remainder of this article explains why KAERI’s reprocessing proposal, like Japan’s reprocessing program, simply amounts to a costly and dangerous political contrivance to get the spent fuel off the reactor sites. The political problem of ultimate radioactive waste disposal would still remain.

**2nc Link Wall**

***US reprocessing destroys negotiations with North Korea & Iran and wrecks our leverage with Korea and Taiwan --- makes prolif inevitable***

**Bunn 05**—Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project. 2005 NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERG COMMITTEE ON SCIENC HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS, FIRST SESSION, JUNE 16, 2005, Serial No. 109–18

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science <http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/science/hsy21711.000/hsy21711_0.htm>, jj

Moreover, **a near-term U.S. return to reprocessing could significantly undermine broader U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policies**. President **Bush has announced an effort to convince countries around the world to forego reprocessing and enrichment capabilities of their own; has continued the efforts of past administrations to convince other states to avoid the further accumulation of separated plutonium, because of the proliferation hazards it poses; and has continued to press states in regions of proliferation concern not to reprocess (including not only states such as North Korea and Iran, but also U.S. allies such South Korea and Taiwan, both of which had secret nuclear weapons programs closely associated with reprocessing efforts in the past**). **A U.S.** decision to **move toward reprocessing** itself **would make it more difficult to convince other states not to do the same.**

***Even if their tech is prolif resistant, ENR builds expertise that makes prolif inevitable***

**Bunn 05**—Matthew Bunn, Associate Professor of Public Policy; Co-Principal Investigator, Project on Managing the Atom; Co-Principal Investigator, Energy Research, Development, Demonstration, and Deployment (ERD3) Policy Project. 2005 NUCLEAR FUEL REPROCESSING HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON ENERG COMMITTEE ON SCIENC HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

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Mr. BUNN. I am a supporter of continued research and development, but I think even with respect to research and development, **we need to be very careful with respect to the proliferation implications**. For example, I am somewhat concerned over pursuing research and development on reprocessing technologies with **South Korea**, which is a country that **has a formal agreement not to have either enrichment or reprocessing on its soil**. **It is a country that had a secret nuclear weapons program that was stopped under U.S. pressure that was based on plutonium reprocessing.** And some of these **technologies,** while they may reduce some of the hazards of PUREX, **are not as proliferation-resistant if you look at the contribution they could make to the acquisition of the needed expertise and facilities if they were broadly deployed in the developing world—the contribution to a proliferating state's nuclear weapons program.**

***Any perception of support for reprocessing will spillover to other tech, undermines US credibility, and builds international expertise that causes prolif***

Thomas B. **Cochran**, dir. Nuclear Program @ Nat. Resources Defense Council, 3-26-**2004**, “Critique of “The Future of Nuclear Power: An Interdisciplinary MIT Study””, http://www.c2es.org/docUploads/10-50\_Cochran.pdf

In addition, the MIT Study recognizes that **the closed fuel cycle represents a serious prolif**eration **threat** when undertaken in any number of non-weapon states, e.g., Iraq, Iran, North Korea, and even Russia. Despite the acknowledgement of poor economic prospects, no significant waste management advantages and high proliferation risks associated with closed fuel cycles, the MIT Study unfortunately leaves the door open to develop new reprocessing technologies. On the other hand, we [the MIT Study group] support modest laboratory scale research and analysis on new separation methods with the objective to learn about separation methods that are less costly and more proliferation resistant. **There has been little exploration in the U**nited **S**tates **of alternatives to PUREX** and pyro-processing since their invention decades ago with entirely different purposes in mind: obtaining weapons usable material and reprocessing metal fuel, respectively. We note however that **there is considerable skepticism for even this modest approach, because** some see ***any U.S. work on reprocessing*** **send**ing **the wrong signal to other nations about the credibility of our expressed attitude toward** the **prolif**eration **risks of reprocessing**, and the concern that **DOE will move from analysis and research to development before the technical basis for such action has been developed**. We propose that this program begin at a modest scale, reaching $10 million per year in about five years. (MIT Study, p. 92) **Instead of curbing DOE’s appetite for promoting technologies that are both dangerous and uneconomical**, **this** MIT Study recommendation likely **will be used by DOE to justify** its Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). The DOE FY 2004 budget for the AFCI is $63 million—over six times what the MIT recommends be spent in five years. The AFCI is coordinated with DOE’s Generation IV program to develop **new reactor concepts** for possible introduction in the 2030 to 2050 time period. Last year DOE organized the Generation-IV International Forum, an effort by 10 countries to jointly develop six nuclear energy systems, including several fast reactor concepts that require closed fuel cycles. The countries included five non-weapon states that formerly had clandestine nuclear weapon programs, namely, South Africa, Argentina, Brazil, South Korea and Switzerland. Although the MIT Study recommends that “[t]he DOE R&D program should be realigned to focus on the open, once-through fuel cycle” (MIT Study, p. x), I fear **the recommendation to engage in modest R&D on closed fuel cycles will be used to *bolster the DOE*** AFCI effort. **This will promote in non-weapon states, including** states that in the **past** had **clandestine nuclear weapon programs, the construction of hot cells for reprocessing R&D and training of** cadres of **experts in plutonium chemistry and metallurgy.** **This** DOE effort **is clearly a threat to U.S. national security.** Because closed fuel cycles are so uneconomical, U.S. government sponsored research on closed fuel cycles is not likely to lead to their adoption. Consequently, in the next fifty years I believe U.S. nuclear plants will stick with the open fuel cycle.

***Clear Signal – US hardline on domestic reprocessing is key to send a clear signal that checks ENR spread***

**Harrell ’11** – research associate at the Project on Managing the Atom at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs (Eben, “Bury Our Nuclear Waste — Before It Buries Us,” August 15, Time Magazine, http://www.time.com/time/health/article/0,8599,2086917,00.html)

The Blue Ribbon Commission doesn't reach a conclusion on whether the U.S. should pursue reprocessing, arguing that consensus on the issue would be "premature." That is a mistake. **Reprocessing is a manifestly dangerous technology**. In the 1970s, **the U.S. renounced commercial reprocessing at home and the spread of the tech**nology abroad **because of** concerns that it would lead to weapons **proliferation**. **It should not reverse this policy**. **The spread of reprocessing to countries in unstable or nuclear-armed regions gives them the infrastructure and expertise needed to quickly develop a bomb should they choose to do so**. (**And don't think safeguards imposed by the *I*nternational *A*tomic *E*nergy *A*gency can stop them. Commercial-scale reprocessing facilities handle so much plutonium that it is almost impossible for inspectors to keep track of it all.**) ***The U.S. must send a message*: if the country with the world's largest number of nuclear reactors *renounces reprocessing*, it delivers a *clear signal* to countries newly interested in nuclear power that the process is not necessary for the future of the nuclear industry**.

***Credibility – any form of US reprocessing crushes US credibility on ENR***

**UCS ’11** – Union of Concerned Scientists (“Nuclear Reprocessing: Dangerous, Dirty, and Expensive,” April 5, http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear\_power/nuclear\_power\_risk/nuclear\_proliferation\_and\_terrorism/nuclear-reprocessing.html)

**Reprocessing would increase the ease of nuclear proliferation**.¶ **U.S. reprocessing would undermine the U.S. goal of halting the spread of fuel cycle technologies that are permitted under the** Nuclear ***N***on-***P***roliferation ***T***reaty **but can be used to make nuclear weapons materials**. **The United States *cannot credibly persuade* other countries to forgo a technology it has newly embraced for its own use**. Although some reprocessing advocates claim that **new reprocessing technologies** under development will be "proliferation resistant," they **would** actually **be** **more difficult for international inspectors to safeguard** because it would be harder to make precise measurements of the weapon-usable materials during and after processing. Moreover, ***all reprocessing* technologies are far more proliferation-prone than direct disposal**.

***ENR Key – US lack of reprocessing is the most valuable signal***

**Lyman ’12** – senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program (Dr. Edwin, “Recommendations of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America’s Nuclear Future,” February 1, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Environment and the Economy Committee, on Energy and Commerce, U.S. House of Representatives, http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/lyman-energy-commerce-statement-brc-20112.pdf)

Finally, UCS agrees with Recommendation 8 that **U.S. leadership is an important factor in promoting safety, nonproliferation and security, and believes that the best approach is for the United States to lead by example**. With regard to the nuclear fuel cycle, **the *most valuable signal* the United States could send to the rest of the world is the demonstration that direct disposal of spent fuel in a nation with a very large nuclear power program is both politically and technically feasible**. In addition, **this would show the rest of the world that reprocessing spent fuel as a waste management strategy is neither necessary nor desirable**.

### South Korea ENR DA UQ

***Global reprocessing renaissance not inevitable --- US decisions make or break --- US rejection of reprocessing builds non-prolif leverage that prevents commercialization of the tech globally, including in South Korea***

**Acton 9** (James, J. associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 4, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament and Technological Restraint”, jj)

***Countering the inevitability argument***

Achieving agreement among all states on the need to forsake particular technologies where the non-proliferation costs are sufficiently high presents a tremendous challenge. In the short term, the idea of new binding rules on access to nuclear technologies is a non-starter, although at least some of that resistance is directed against a discriminatory approach.39

Absent global agreement, the nuclear industry in states deciding to forsake technologies unilaterally is likely to make the argument that ‘**if we don’t develop it, someone else will’**. Indeed, **this was a key argument of the US nuclear industry against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to desist from domestic reprocessing**.40

Policymakers and regulators certainly ought to weigh this concern in deciding whether to fund or license novel technologies. However, ***the technological trajectory of nuclear energy is not inevitable.*** **Decisions by key states not to fund research and development into novel technologies can result in them not being commercialised.**

Moreover, **states that are serious about disarmament, and have chosen to forsake certain technologies on non-proliferation grounds, can take steps to shape the technological trajectories of others, making it less likely that they will seek the same technologies**. **These steps include stopping domestic use of the most sensitive technologies, trading in less sensitive technologies**, and taking back spent nuclear fuel. **These options are useful first steps on the way to a legally binding instrument banning the most sensitive technologies.**

**History shows the flaws in the nuclear industry’s argument that the technological trajectory of nuclear energy is inevitable and that it is therefore pointless for individual governments to forsake sensitive technologies**. Looking back, for instance, it is clear **that there was nothing inevitable about the success that the** light-water reactor (**LWR) enjoys today**. As of 2008, LWRs accounted for 359 out of 441 reactor units in operation and almost 90% of their total electrical output.41 This dominance was the result of a conscious, deliberate development strategy. During the early days of commercial nuclear power, two other designs, the gas-cooled reactor (GCR) and the heavy-water reactor (HWR), were competitive; indeed, the GCR was the market leader until the mid 1960s.42 Given that the GCR and HWR are simpler and do not use enriched fuel, **the dominance of the LWR was far from inevitable**. Indeed, the debate about the light-water reactor’s technological superiority is still not settled, including among those with no financial stake in HWR sales.

**The success of the LWR resulted from significant investment by the United States** and Russia. Almost every such reactor operating today has its origins in US or Soviet technology. Although other nations do manufacture LWRs – indeed, there are now no wholly US-owned suppliers – the non- Russian designs all originated from technical transfers from the United States.43 The only partial exceptions are nine Swedish-origin and four Chinese-origin reactors that are largely, but not completely, indigenous.44 US interest in the LWR stemmed from a programme to develop reactors for naval propulsion. The two key US nuclear engineering firms, Westinghouse and General Electric, were deeply involved in this programme. **Had Washington not had an interest in the LWR** as a naval-propulsion reactor and not been willing to further develop it for civilian use, **the GCR and HWR may well have ended up as the industry standard today.** (Given that the LWR is less proliferation sensitive than either the GCR or HWR, its success was a considerable non-proliferation good.)

**The argument against inevitability only becomes stronger in the case of more sophisticated technologies requiring much larger capital costs, such as the fast reactor** or laser enrichment. **Decisions by** a few key states – or perhaps ***the United States alone*** – **not to invest in these technologies and instead to focus on alternatives (whether renewables or other types of nuclear tech**nology) **increase the likelihood that some technologies will not be developed at all.**

Fast reactors, for instance, have been under development since the early days of nuclear power; the first nuclear reactor ever connected to an electric grid was a fast reactor. However, as research has progressed and the technical challenges of this technology have become more apparent, the prospect of commercialised fast reactors has remained distant, and their costs have continually increased. The United States alone spent $25bn (in 2009 dollars) on fast-reactor development prior to the development programme’s cancellation in 1988, and failed even to start building a prototype commercial reactor.45 Prior to the Bush administration’s renewed advocacy of the concept, all states except Russia were losing interest.46 **It is far from clear that interest in fast reactors will survive the combination of the Obama administration’s much more sceptical attitude**47 and the current financial crisis.

***Don’t buy their prolif resistance args***

**Carnegie 10**—Frank von Hippel, Lora Saalman, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11-1, Plutonium, Nonproliferation, and Radioactive Waste Politics in East Asia, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/01/plutonium-nonproliferation-and-radioactive-waste-politics-in-east-asia/1te9>, jj

Proliferation Risks: Von Hippel argued ***there is no such thing as “proliferation-resistant reprocessing***.” He reported that **civilian reprocessing programs have generated a significant amount of weapons-directed separated plutonium**. **Reprocessing makes civilian plutonium accessible for nuclear devices, as India showed in 1974**. **Separated plutonium is also a greater theft risk, due to its relative ease of transportation compared to plutonium in a spent fuel assembly. This makes reprocessing not only a proliferation threat, but also a risk for potential terrorist acquisition.**

#### US won’t make concessions on ENR now

Lee Chi-dong, 3/1/13, yonhap news, (News Focus) Park-Obama summit feared to be overshadowed by stalled talks on nuclear cooperation, <http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/national/2013/03/01/13/0301000000AEN20130301000100315F.HTML>, jj

The Obama administration, however, takes a dim view of Seoul's push in light of Washington's nonproliferation campaign.

Washington is apparently worried about the possibility that South Korea's expansion of its nuclear program will create a domino effect.

U.S. officials also point out South Korea agreed not to "possess nuclear processing and uranium enrichment facilities" in the 1992 joint declaration with North Korea on the denuclearization of the peninsula.

Although North Korea has violated the declaration, South Korea's official stance is that the document remains in force.

Observers express skepticism that the U.S. government will make concessions in the nuclear energy cooperation talks with South Korea.

#### US not caving now --- key to check prolif --- and South Korea still wants it

Revere ’13 – Evans J.R. Revere, Nonresident Senior Fellow, Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies, February 2013, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, CENTER FOR NORTHEAST ASIAN POLICY STUDIES, UNITED STATES-REPUBLIC OF KOREA RELATIONS IN PRESIDENT OBAMA’S SECOND TERM: MANAGING CHALLENGE AND CHANGE, <http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/research/files/papers/2013/02/us%20south%20korea%20relations%20revere/us%20south%20korea%20relations%20revere.pdf>, jj

U.S. and ROK officials have been negotiating the renewal of the agreement governing peaceful cooperation in nuclear energy, which expires in March 2014. The ROK, which anticipates encountering spent nuclear fuel storage problems in the future, has sought U.S. concurrence in allowing Korea to establish a full nuclear fuel cycle, including enrichment and reprocessing. The United States has been unwilling to do so because of concerns about proliferation. U.S. reluctance also stems from concerns that acceding to the ROK request would open the door to similar demands by other countries. And Washington is rightly concerned that it would also complicate the task of stopping the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program, which relies on both reprocessing and uranium enrichment.

***Global precedent against ENR now – Taiwan 123 agreement will strengthen the norm***

Elaine M. **Grossman**, 7-19-20**12**, “Taiwan Ready to Forgo Nuclear Fuel-Making in U.S. Trade Pact Renewal,” National Journal, <http://www.nationaljournal.com/nationalsecurity/taiwan-ready-to-forgo-nuclear-fuel-making-in-u-s-trade-pact-renewal-20120719>

**The government of Taiwan is prepared to renounce any right to produce nuclear fuel in a forthcoming renewal of its 40-year-old atomic energy cooperation agreement with the United States**, according to officials from both nations (see GSN, May 4).

If Taiwan proceeds as expected, **the East Asian island nation would be the first U.S. nuclear energy partner state to make such a pledge since the United Arab Emirates promised in a 2009 trade agreement that it would not enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium on its territory.**

**The UAE accord has been widely hailed as a significant step for nuclear nonproliferation.** The **Obama** administration three years ago **dubbed it the “gold standard**” for future atomic trade agreements around the globe.

“**This is proof that there are at least two countries -- and probably more -- out there that are willing to undertake a legally binding gold standard in their nuclear cooperation agreement**,” one congressional source said on Wednesday. “[**It] helps establish a new global precedent that enrichment and reprocessing aren’t necessary for a truly civil nuclear program**.”

#### Even if they don’t’ want it now, plan means they want it again. Proves uniqueness for our arg

## CP

#### CP boosts U.S. nuclear leadership and checks prolif, and countries say yes --- solves all 3 deficits 2ac outlines

Ferguson et. al 11—\*\*\*\*Charles D. Ferguson is president of the Federation of American Scientists and adjunct professor in the Security Studies Program at Georgetown University. He has recently completed the book Nuclear Energy: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, May 2011). Trained as a nuclear engineer in the U.S. Navy, he has worked on nuclear safety policy in the U.S. Department of State. He earned a Ph.D. in physics from Boston University.

\*\*\*Clifford Singer is a professor of nuclear, plasma, and radiological engineering and of political science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. He is the author of Energy and International War: From Babylon to Baghdad and Beyond (Scientific Press, 2008). Dr. Singer is a former director of the Program in Arms Control, Disarmament, and International Security at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, where he is currently codirector of the College of Engineering’s Initiative on Energy and Sustainability Engineering. He was also the last chair of the Champaign County Intergovernmental Solid Waste Disposal Association.

\*\*Jack Spencer is a research fellow in nuclear energy policy at the Heritage Foundation, where he works on nuclear waste management, technological advances, industry subsidies, and international approaches to nuclear energy. He has testified before Congress on related topics, including 2010 testimony on how to introduce market forces into public policy for safely managing nuclear waste. Mr. Spencer returned to Heritage in September 2007, after working on commercial, civilian, and military components of nuclear energy at the Babcock & Wilcox Companies. From 1998 to 2005, he was a Heritage analyst on defense and national security.

\*Sharon Squassoni is senior fellow and director of the Proliferation Prevention Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). She joined CSIS from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, where she was a senior scholar focusing on nuclear energy and nonproliferation. Her government service includes advising Congress as a senior specialist in weapons of mass destruction at the Congressional Research Service and various positions in the State Department and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. She is author of Nuclear Energy: Rebirth or Resuscitation? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2009) and many other publications.

U.S. Spent Nuclear Fuel a market-based solution, CSIS, online, jj

Implementing a market-driven approach along the lines suggested here would enhance the United States’ ability as a nuclear supplier to influence other countries’ nuclear fuel cycle choices. It would give the United States an option for providing an integrated package of nuclear fuel supply and take-back that reduces incentives for other countries to set up their own facilities for uranium enrichment, spent fuel reprocessing, or both. The United States would be better positioned to help secure forms of spent fuel abroad that pose proliferation risks. Some countries may want to cooperate with the United States in this way simply to reduce their nuclear fuel cycle costs, with benefits also to U.S. industry and in the form of funds paid to U.S. states that import spent nuclear fuel. Other countries may want to cooperate with the United States in pursuit of regional security and nuclear nonproliferation goals. The resulting flexibility will give the United States an addition al tool to support nonproliferation initiatives.

***Security measures solve***

**CSIS 12**

Sarah Weiner is a research intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues. The views expressed above are her own and do not necessarily reflect those of the Center for Strategic and International Studies or the Project on Nuclear Issues.

Security in the U.S. Nuclear Complex, 8-30-12, <http://csis.org/blog/security-us-nuclear-complex>, jj

**The NNSA and the DOE** are not unaware of these issues and in most instances **have undertaken good-faith efforts to correct problems as they arise**. **For example, the NNSA has begun a comprehensive program to consolidate the number of sites containing special nuclear material (SNM), including the type of weapons-grade uranium that could be fashioned into an IND**. The good news is that since its failure in 2008, Lawrence Livermore has removed over 90% of its SNM. The bad news: Y-12 is slated to be the new hub of HEU storage in the future. This two-steps-forward-one-step-back pattern of progress seems characteristic of the NNSA’s handling of security failures, perhaps pointing to a more systemic issue with the organization and maintenance of the nuclear complex. **Suggestions for corrective action range from radical organizational transformation of the NNSA and DOE to more modest changes in administration, including streamlining contracting procedures for nuclear sites and federalizing nuclear security forces**. Many argue that ultimately, the most effective method for securing US nuclear material is not to increase security forces but to decrease material. By downblending surplus HEU into reactor-ready low-enriched uranium (LEU), the U.S. could functionally shrink the target terrorists may attempt to hit.

***Consolidation solves theft***

**NWCC 09**

Nuclear Weapons Complex Consolidation (NWCC) Policy Network

Lead Author Robert L. Civiak Contributing authors Christopher Paine, Natural Resources Defense Council Peter Stockton and Ingrid Drake, Project On Government Oversight Jay Coghlan, Nuclear Watch New Mexico Marylia Kelley, Tri-Valley CAREs Transforming the U.S. Strategic Posture and Weapons Complex for Transition to a Nuclear Weapons-Free World

<http://docs.nrdc.org/nuclear/files/nuc_09040701a.pdf>, jj

**Our proposals**, outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 of this report, **would consolidate SNM more rapidly and extensively than NNSA’s plan**. In addition, we would significantly speed up elimination of all excess HEU, would seek to eliminate all excess plutonium, and would consolidate most nuclear weapons activities to only three sites (LANL, Pantex, and SNL) by 2025. Furthermore, **we recommend that the B&W HEU-processing activities in Erwin, TN and Lynchburg, VA be relocated to Y-12**, as long as the move does not interfere with the downblending of excess HEU. **This would consolidate all U.S. HEU-processing activities at a single site**. Such a move might be facilitated by the fact that B&W also manages the Y-12 Site for DOE.

### Russia Plank

#### Counterplan solves US-Russian relations – creates sustained co-op

Pifer 2012 (Steven, Direct of the Arms Control Initiative and Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Center on the United States and Europe, Brookings Institute)

<http://www.brookings.edu/research/testimony/2012/03/21-arms-control-pifer>

Improving U.S.-Russian relations further may prove more difficult than it has been in the past three years, as the easier questions have been settled. Nevertheless, Washington should seek to work with Russia on a number of issues. ¶ First, Washington should engage Moscow on a further bilateral round of nuclear arms reductions, this time including strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons, whether deployed or non-deployed, under a common ceiling in a follow-on agreement to New START. A sublimit on deployed strategic warheads could restrict those nuclear weapons of greatest concern. While Moscow currently shows little enthusiasm for further nuclear cuts, it may have incentives to deal. Such an agreement would promote a more stable balance at lower levels of nuclear weapons. It would respond to the concern expressed by the Senate in its resolution of ratification for New START that non-strategic nuclear weapons be addressed. And it could produce cost savings, freeing up defense resources to fund operations that the U.S. military is far more likely to engage in than nuclear war. ¶ Second, Washington and NATO should continue to pursue a cooperative missile defense arrangement with Russia. That prospect is currently stalled by Moscow’s demand for a legal guarantee that U.S. missile defenses in Europe not be directed against Russian strategic missile forces. While it is reasonable for the Russians to be concerned that missile defenses could affect the offense-defense relationship, that is a concern for the future. It is very difficult to see the U.S. plan for missile defenses in Europe over the next decade posing any serious threat to Russian strategic missiles. ¶ NATO should leave the door open for cooperation and provide transparency about its missile defense capabilities and plans. A cooperative missile defense arrangement would be a significant achievement. It would remove one of the thornier issues from the U.S.-Russia and NATO-Russia agendas; provide for a better defense of Europe than just a NATO system alone; and give the Russian military greater transparency about U.S. and NATO missile defense capabilities. Such transparency could help assure Moscow that those missile defense capabilities pose no threat. Such cooperation, moreover, could prove a “game-changer” in attitudes by making NATO and Russia genuine partners in defending Europe against ballistic missile attack.

### A2: PU-238 Shortage Adv – 1nc Frontline

#### NASA and DOE fixed the plutonium shortage

Wall 12 Mike Wall, SPACE.com Senior Writer, 4-6-12, Space.com, Plutonium Production May Avert Spacecraft Fuel Shortage, <http://www.space.com/15184-plutonium238-spacecraft-fuel-production.html>, jj

New batches of plutonium-238 may become available to NASA starting in 2017, perhaps preventing feared shortages of this vital spacecraft fuel.

The United States hasn't produced plutonium-238 — a radioactive isotope that's been powering NASA space probes for five decades — since the late 1980s, and planetary scientists say stockpiles are worryingly low. But a production restart is now underway, say officials with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), which supplies plutonium-238 to the space agency.

"We have turned the spade in starting the project for renewed plutonium production," Wade Carroll, DOE's deputy director of space and defense power systems, said in March at the Nuclear and Emerging Technologies for Space (NETS) conference in The Woodlands, Texas. "It'll take probably five or six years before the next new plutonium is available."

#### NASA has enough --- status quo solves

Wall 12 Mike Wall, SPACE.com Senior Writer, 4-6-12, Space.com, Plutonium Production May Avert Spacecraft Fuel Shortage, <http://www.space.com/15184-plutonium238-spacecraft-fuel-production.html>, jj

Progress being made

Despite the bad budget news, some restart planning and technological development are already underway, according to Carroll. And NASA is doing what it can to help the project along.

"Right now, I think there's $10 million in this year's budget and $10 million in next year's budget, which we do plan on sending to the Department of Energy to continue the efforts that we've begun," Leonard Dudzinski, a NASA program executive who deals with radioisotope power systems, said at the NETS conference.

"I'm fully confident that we will be able to continue this, and ultimately have plutonium produced in this country again in kilogram quantities, on an annual basis," he added.

The goal is to eventually produce between 3.3 pounds and 4.4 pounds (1.5 to 2 kg) of plutonium-238 per year, which should be enough to support NASA's robotic planetary science missions, Dudzinsky said.

***Environment can survive anything***

**Easterbrook 96** (Gregg, sr editor, The New Republic, former fellow at the Brookings Institute, A Movement on the Earth, p. 25)

 "Fragile environment" has become a welded phrase of the modern lexicon, like "aging hippie" or "fugitive financier." But **the notion of a fragile environment is profoundly wrong**. Individual animals, plants, and people are distressingly fragile. **The environment** that contains them **is** close to **indestructible.** The living environment of **Earth has survived ice ages**; bombardments of **cosmic radiation** more deadly than atomic fallout; **solar radiation more powerful than the worst-case projection for ozone depletion;** **thousand-year periods of intense volcanism releasing global air pollution far worse than that made by any factory**; **reversals of the planet's magnetic poles; the rearrangement of continents; transformation of plains into mountain ranges and of seas into plains;** **fluctuations of ocean currents and the jet stream; 300-foot vacillations in sea levels; shortening and lengthening of the seasons caused by shifts in the planetary axis; collisions of asteroids and comets** bearing far more force than man's nuclear arsenals; **and the years without summer that followed these impacts. Yet hearts beat on, and petals unfold still.** **Were the environment fragile it would have expired many eons before the advent of the industrial affronts of the dreaming ape.** **Human assaults on the environment**, though mischievous, **are pinpricks compared to forces of the magnitude nature is accustomed to resisting.**

### China

***Visa’s block deep cooperation – their author***

**Lyons et al. ’9** ((~~[Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), "United States-China Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security", Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center

10 .. **One of the roadblocks to** the development of **cooperative**

**opportunities is the U.S. visa issuance system**. **The**

**Atlantic Council was encouraged to ask** the U.S.

Department of **State to improve** its **processing of visa**

**applications to** significantly **shorten the time needed for**

**Chinese nationals involved in nuclear power to obtain**

**a visa** for travel to the U.S. Consider, for example, that

France provides a dedicated consulate. It is important

to recognize that U.S. authorities must take into

consideration the security of nuclear facilities but that

a better balance can be reached. This is a problem that

can be solved.

***Cooperation now – their author***

**Lyons et al. ’9** ((~~[Blythe J. Lyons, John R. Lyman, Mihaela Carstei, and General Richard L. Lawson (USAF), "United States-China Cooperation On Nuclear Power: An Opportunity for Fostering Sustainable Energy Security", Atlantic Council, 3-4/3-6 2009, http://www.acus.org/files/publication\_pdfs/65/AtlanticCouncil-USChinaNuclearPower.pdf, Based on the Dialogue Sponsored by the Atlantic Council and the U.S./China Energy and Environment Technology Center

13 .. **Cooperation on** the development of **advanced fuel**

**cycle technologies**, **already underway in U.S.-China**

**working groups, will provide significant opportunities**

**to share rather than duplicate knowledge and funding.**

**Generation IV** (Gen IV) **international collaboration on R&D**

**is necessary** and beneficial for all participants to share

costs, facilities and experience. **Specific fuel cycle R&D**

**opportunities proposed by the** State Nuclear Power

Technology corporation (**SNPTC) include the following:**

**Advanced fuel, such as mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, and**

**metal fuel;**

**Transmutation technology, such as fast reactor and**

**accelerator driven systems;**

**Reprocessing technologies, such as MOX spent fuel**

**reprocessing, dry processing, on-site recycle; and,**

**Repository design technology.**

#### 1. No risk of US/China war---Chinese heg isn’t a threat, economic interdependence checks, miscalc won’t happen and deterrence checks escalation

Art ’10 (Robert J, Christian A. Herter Professor of [International Relations](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Relations) at Brandeis University and Fellow at [MIT Center for International Studies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MIT_Center_for_International_Studies) Fall, Political Science Quarterly, Volume 125, #3, “The United States and the Rise of China: Implications for the Long Haul” <http://www.psqonline.org/99_article.php3?byear=2010&bmonth=fall&a=01free>, jj)

China does not present the type of security threat to the United States that Germany did to Britain, or Britain to Germany. Americaʼs nuclear forces make it secure from any Chinese attack on the homeland. Moreover, China clearly presents a potentially different type of threat to the United States than the Soviet Union did during the Cold War, because the geopolitics of the two situations are different. The Soviet geopolitical (as opposed to the nuclear) threat was two-fold: to conquer and dominate the economic–industrial resources of western Eurasia and to control the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf. Europe and the Persian Gulf constituted two of the five power centers of the world during the Cold War—Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States being the other three. If the Soviets had succeeded in dominating Europe and the Persian Gulf through either conquest or political–military intimidation, then it would have controlled three of the five power centers of the world. That would have been a significant power transition. Chinaʼs rise does not constitute the same type of geopolitical threat to the United States that the Soviet Union did. If China ends up dominating the Korean peninsula and a significant part of continental Southeast Asia, so what? As long as Japan remains outside the Chinese sphere of influence and allied with the United States, and as long as the United States retains some naval footholds in Southeast Asia, such as in Singapore, the Philippines, or Indonesia, Chinaʼs domination of these two areas would not present the same type of geopolitical threat that the Soviet Union did. As long as Europe, the Persian Gulf, Japan, India, and Russia (once it reconstitutes itself as a serious great power) remain either as independent power centers or under U.S. influence, Chinese hegemony on land in East and Southeast Asia will not tip the world balance of power. The vast size and central position of the Soviet Union in Eurasia constituted a geopolitical threat to American influence that China cannot hope to emulate. If judged by the standards of the last three dominant power-rising power competitions of the last 100 years, then, the U.S.–China competition appears well placed to be much safer. Certainly, war between the two is not impossible, because either or both governments could make a serious misstep over the Taiwan issue. War by miscalculation is always possible, but the possession of nuclear weapons by both sides has to have a restraining effect on each by dramatically raising the costs of miscalculation, thereby increasing the incentives not to miscalculate. Nuclear deterrence should work to lower dramatically the possibility of war by either miscalculation or deliberate decision (or if somehow such a war broke out, then nuclear deterrence should work against its escalation into a large and fearsome one). Apart from the Taiwan issue or some serious incident at sea, it is hard to figure out how to start a war between the United States and China. There are no other territorial disputes of any significance between the two, and there are no foreseeable economic contingencies that could bring on a war between them. Finally, the high economic interdependence and the lack of intense ideological competition between them help to reinforce the pacific effects induced by the condition of mutual assured destruction. The workings of these three factors should make us cautiously optimistic about keeping Sino-American relations on the peaceful rather than the warlike track. The peaceful track does not, by any means, imply the absence of political and economic conflicts in Sino-American relations, nor does it foreclose coercive diplomatic gambits by each against the other. What it does mean is that the conditions are in place for war to be a low-probability event, if policymakers are smart in both states (see below), and that an all-out war is nearly impossible to imagine. By the historical standards of recent dominant-rising state dyads, this is no mean feat. In sum, there will be some security dilemma dynamics at work in the U.S.–China relationship, both over Taiwan and over maritime supremacy in East Asia, should China decide eventually to contest Americaʼs maritime hegemony, and there will certainly be political and military conflicts, but nuclear weapons should work to mute their severity because the security of each stateʼs homeland will never be in doubt as long as each maintains a secondstrike capability vis-à-vis the other. If two states cannot conquer one another, then the character of their relation and their competition changes dramatically.

## Solvency

***Too financially risky***

**Ferguson 10**—Charles D. Ferguson, president of the Federation of American Scientists, based in Washington, D.C., 05.04.10, Forbes, Controlling Asia's Nuclear Power Tigers, <http://www.forbes.com/2010/05/04/asia-nuclear-power-markets-economy-national-security.html>, jj

**Market forces**, however, **will** continue to **limit** the further **growth of reprocessing as long as this** activity **remains more expensive than** the alternative--**the uranium-based fuel cycle**. Most **countries have refrained from reprocessing because of** its **financial risks**.

***Reprocessing is 300 percent more expensive***

**Barczak 11**—Sara oversees our coastal office in Savannah, Georgia, which opened in March 2000 after the former Georgians for Clean Energy hired her in October 1999. As program director for high risk energy choices, Sara provides extensive support to concerned citizens and organizing partners, participates in legislative, state and federal regulatory forums on issues concerning nuclear energy, public safety, utilities and the negative impacts of power plants on the region’s water resources. She participated in a U.S./Russian exchange with non-governmental organizations in Russia impacted by plutonium bomb fuel (MOX) programs, including travel to Russia. Sara has worked for over thirteen years in diverse environmental fields in the private and non-profit sectors: as an environmental consultant for Department of Defense facilities relating to hazardous waste and air quality issues and as a citizen’s advocate, educator and consultant for two non-profit organizations. Sara received a B.A. in Biology from Lawrence University. 7-8-11, Clean Energy Footprint, Take Action: Prevent Reprocessing, <http://blog.cleanenergy.org/2011/07/08/reprocessing-take-action/>, jj

**Reprocessing, development and use of plutonium fuel** (or MOX) **are much more costly than traditional, uranium-fueled reactors, with fuel cycle cost increases estimated as high as 300%**. As is usual with nuclear projects, **these costs will likely fall on U.S. taxpayers and utility ratepayers**. For instance, TVA may participate in the troubled plutonium fuel scheme.

***Reprocessing isn’t economical***

**Wilson 12**—Paul P.H. Wilson, 2012, Comparing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options, A report for the Reactor & Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, [http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620221039/http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/wilson.fuel\_.cycle\_.comparisons\_final.pdf](http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620221039/http%3A//brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/wilson.fuel_.cycle_.comparisons_final.pdf), jj

**Most advanced fuel cycle technologies have never been constructed or operated at a commercial scale, and many exist only in paper studies or small scale laboratory experiments.** As a result, **the behavior of these systems when deployed at a large scale is subject to large uncertainties and extrapolation from existing technology**. Furthermore, **even existing reprocessing technologies** deployed at commercial scales in France, UK and Japan, **have large uncertainties in their economic metrics**. As a consequence, **most fuel cycle systems analyses produce results with large uncertainty bands, whether explicitly indicated or not, and are best used for a comparative analysis than a predictive estimate of their absolute performance**.

***Near term transition fails***

**Wilson 12**—Paul P.H. Wilson, 2012, Comparing Nuclear Fuel Cycle Options, A report for the Reactor & Fuel Cycle Technology Subcommittee of the Blue Ribbon Commission on America's Nuclear Future, [http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620221039/http://brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/wilson.fuel\_.cycle\_.comparisons\_final.pdf](http://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/brc/20120620221039/http%3A//brc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/wilson.fuel_.cycle_.comparisons_final.pdf), jj

6 Summary

Despite the challenges identified in section 1.3, most systematic analyses of advanced fuel cycles have similar conclusions. Increasing burnup in once through fuel cycles has a small impact on most metrics: it may have incremental improvements that are commercially attractive, but indicate a need for widespread policy changes. **Thermal recycle in light water reactors is found repeatedly to offer only modest benefits in some waste management and resource consumption metrics, while negatively impacting other waste management metrics, posing at least an incremental reduction in proliferation resistance, and with a high likelihood of increased cost**. **The lack of commercial interest in** unsubsidized **thermal recycling in the United States is a further indication of these findings. Continuous recycling strategies, involving fast reactors, can be configured to reduce the amount of TRU that is sent to the repository, but have a small impact on the amount of TRU that exists in the fuel cycle. A substantial quantity of other waste streams would also arise from these fuel cycles and many of those waste streams do not yet have final disposal pathways. The economic uncertainty is higher for these fuel cycles, but they are likely to be more expensive.** Similarly, **the impact on proliferation metrics is varied, but implementing sufficient safeguards to accommodate the increased inventories of separated special nuclear material may have economic consequences**. ***These findings do not support a near-term transition to advanced fuel cycles.***

## Prolif

### UQ

***No reprocessing renaissance now --- countries are opting for a once-through cycle***

**Yudin 09**—Yury Yudin, UNIDIR/2009/4, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research, Multilateralization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Assessing the Existing Proposals <http://unidir.org/pdf/activites/pdf2-act439.pdf>, jj

Since the beginning of this century, international attention has been increasingly focused on multilateral approaches to the front end (uranium enrichment) of the nuclear fuel cycle (see Annex A for an explanation of the fuel cycle). **A global “plutonium economy” is still out of sight and, in spite of some revival of interest in the closed nuclear cycle and recycling of plutonium, for the next few decades the once-through nuclear fuel cycle without the reprocessing of spent fuel seems to be the option of choice for the majority of countries for economic and technical reasons**. **Most countries have already decided to adopt interim storage instead of reprocessing their spent power-reactor fuel**, at least as a medium-term alternative, **and there are no immediate expectations for new reprocessing plants or a growing demand for reprocessing services in the world.**

***Reprocessing down globally --- proves the US moratorium has been effective***

**Lyman & Hippel 08**—Edwin Lyman is a senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program. Frank N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. April 2008, Arms Control Association, Reprocessing Revisited:The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/LymanVonHippel>, jj

Radioactive Waste Politics and **the Rise and Fall of Civilian Reprocessing Abroad**

In the 1970s, nuclear utilities in Western Europe and Japan found a temporary fix for their waste problems by shipping spent fuel for reprocessing in France and the United Kingdom, which had originally built reprocessing plants to produce plutonium for their weapons programs. In parallel, the Soviet Union took back spent fuel from Eastern European countries that it had supplied with fresh fuel and reprocessed some of it.

States that shipped spent fuel to the Soviet Union were able to get rid of it forever. States that shipped to France and the United Kingdom obtained only a temporary respite from their disposal problem. Domestic politics made it impossible for France or the United Kingdom to keep the radioactive waste generated from their reprocessing of foreign spent fuel. They therefore required that the separated plutonium and the concentrated high-level waste from reprocessing be shipped back to the country of origin. This meant that the customer countries had to locate and build high-level radioactive waste and plutonium storage facilities even after paying reprocessing charges 10 times larger than it would have cost simply to store the spent fuel. Recently, Russia has adopted the same policy of shipping high-level waste back to its foreign reprocessing customers.

As a result, **13 of the 14 customer countries that made reprocessing a source of foreign exchange for France, Russia, and the United Kingdom have decided not to renew their reprocessing contracts**.[6] **Twelve have decided on interim storage of their spent fuel**. The thirteenth, Japan, has built its own $20 billion reprocessing facility. Japan justifies this costly decision by arguing that, otherwise, with no way to ship spent fuel from its nuclear power plant sites, it would have had to shut them all down.[7]

**Given the loss of all of its foreign customers, the United Kingdom plans to shut down its reprocessing plants**.[8] After this, only China, France, India, Japan, and Russia will operate reprocessing facilities. **China does not have an operating reprocessing plant today**, but it is building a pilot reprocessing plant and is negotiating with France to purchase a full-scale plant.[9] **Belgium, Germany, and Italy have shut down their pilot-scale reprocessing plants.**

Thus, **three decades after the United States adopted an anti-reprocessing policy, one nuclear-weapon state is quitting,** another is starting, **three non-nuclear-weapon states have quit, and 12 non-nuclear-weapon states that were having their spent fuel reprocessed abroad have quit or will quit soon.** Japan, which had completed a pilot reprocessing plant in 1974 before the United States reversed its pro-reprocessing policy, remains the only non-nuclear-weapon state that reprocesses. Its reprocessing program has been a major source of suspicion and envy in South Korea.

***Global reprocessing renaissance not inevitable --- US decisions make or break --- US rejection of reprocessing builds non-prolif leverage that prevents commercialization of the tech globally, including in South Korea***

**Acton 9** (James, J. associate in the Nonproliferation Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Survival, Vol. 51, No. 4, “Nuclear Power, Disarmament and Technological Restraint”, jj)

***Countering the inevitability argument***

Achieving agreement among all states on the need to forsake particular technologies where the non-proliferation costs are sufficiently high presents a tremendous challenge. In the short term, the idea of new binding rules on access to nuclear technologies is a non-starter, although at least some of that resistance is directed against a discriminatory approach.39

Absent global agreement, the nuclear industry in states deciding to forsake technologies unilaterally is likely to make the argument that ‘**if we don’t develop it, someone else will’**. Indeed, **this was a key argument of the US nuclear industry against President Jimmy Carter’s decision to desist from domestic reprocessing**.40

Policymakers and regulators certainly ought to weigh this concern in deciding whether to fund or license novel technologies. However, ***the technological trajectory of nuclear energy is not inevitable.*** **Decisions by key states not to fund research and development into novel technologies can result in them not being commercialised.**

Moreover, **states that are serious about disarmament, and have chosen to forsake certain technologies on non-proliferation grounds, can take steps to shape the technological trajectories of others, making it less likely that they will seek the same technologies**. **These steps include stopping domestic use of the most sensitive technologies, trading in less sensitive technologies**, and taking back spent nuclear fuel. **These options are useful first steps on the way to a legally binding instrument banning the most sensitive technologies.**

**History shows the flaws in the nuclear industry’s argument that the technological trajectory of nuclear energy is inevitable and that it is therefore pointless for individual governments to forsake sensitive technologies**. Looking back, for instance, it is clear **that there was nothing inevitable about the success that the** light-water reactor (**LWR) enjoys today**. As of 2008, LWRs accounted for 359 out of 441 reactor units in operation and almost 90% of their total electrical output.41 This dominance was the result of a conscious, deliberate development strategy. During the early days of commercial nuclear power, two other designs, the gas-cooled reactor (GCR) and the heavy-water reactor (HWR), were competitive; indeed, the GCR was the market leader until the mid 1960s.42 Given that the GCR and HWR are simpler and do not use enriched fuel, **the dominance of the LWR was far from inevitable**. Indeed, the debate about the light-water reactor’s technological superiority is still not settled, including among those with no financial stake in HWR sales.

**The success of the LWR resulted from significant investment by the United States** and Russia. Almost every such reactor operating today has its origins in US or Soviet technology. Although other nations do manufacture LWRs – indeed, there are now no wholly US-owned suppliers – the non- Russian designs all originated from technical transfers from the United States.43 The only partial exceptions are nine Swedish-origin and four Chinese-origin reactors that are largely, but not completely, indigenous.44 US interest in the LWR stemmed from a programme to develop reactors for naval propulsion. The two key US nuclear engineering firms, Westinghouse and General Electric, were deeply involved in this programme. **Had Washington not had an interest in the LWR** as a naval-propulsion reactor and not been willing to further develop it for civilian use, **the GCR and HWR may well have ended up as the industry standard today.** (Given that the LWR is less proliferation sensitive than either the GCR or HWR, its success was a considerable non-proliferation good.)

**The argument against inevitability only becomes stronger in the case of more sophisticated technologies requiring much larger capital costs, such as the fast reactor** or laser enrichment. **Decisions by** a few key states – or perhaps ***the United States alone*** – **not to invest in these technologies and instead to focus on alternatives (whether renewables or other types of nuclear tech**nology) **increase the likelihood that some technologies will not be developed at all.**

Fast reactors, for instance, have been under development since the early days of nuclear power; the first nuclear reactor ever connected to an electric grid was a fast reactor. However, as research has progressed and the technical challenges of this technology have become more apparent, the prospect of commercialised fast reactors has remained distant, and their costs have continually increased. The United States alone spent $25bn (in 2009 dollars) on fast-reactor development prior to the development programme’s cancellation in 1988, and failed even to start building a prototype commercial reactor.45 Prior to the Bush administration’s renewed advocacy of the concept, all states except Russia were losing interest.46 **It is far from clear that interest in fast reactors will survive the combination of the Obama administration’s much more sceptical attitude**47 and the current financial crisis.

**2nc – Causes Prolif**

***Don’t buy their prolif resistance args***

**Carnegie 10**—Frank von Hippel, Lora Saalman, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 11-1, Plutonium, Nonproliferation, and Radioactive Waste Politics in East Asia, <http://carnegieendowment.org/2010/11/01/plutonium-nonproliferation-and-radioactive-waste-politics-in-east-asia/1te9>, jj

Proliferation Risks: Von Hippel argued ***there is no such thing as “proliferation-resistant reprocessing***.” He reported that **civilian reprocessing programs have generated a significant amount of weapons-directed separated plutonium**. **Reprocessing makes civilian plutonium accessible for nuclear devices, as India showed in 1974**. **Separated plutonium is also a greater theft risk, due to its relative ease of transportation compared to plutonium in a spent fuel assembly. This makes reprocessing not only a proliferation threat, but also a risk for potential terrorist acquisition.**

***India proves --- and, turns are unique***

**Dennis et. al 09** – Kate J. Dennis and Christopher D. Holmes are PhD candidates at Harvard University’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Kurt Z. House is the president of Cambridge-based C12 Energy. Benjamin G. Lee is a postdoctoral researcher at the National Renewable Energy Lab in Golden, Colorado. Lee T. Murray, Justin Parrella, and Jason Rugolo are PhD candidates at Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences. David M. Romps is a research scientist at Harvard’s Department of Earth and Planetary Sciences. Mark T. Winkler is a PhD candidate at Harvard’s Department of Physics. The two undecideds, Jacob J. Krich and Ernst A. van Nierop, contributed to this article as well. Krich is a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard’s Center for the Environment; van Nierop is the director of engineering at C12 Energy.

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2009, The case against nuclear

Reprocessing, DoI: 10.2968/065006003, <http://www.davidmthompson.org/2009/reprocessing/09reprocessing.pdf>, jj

In addition to theft, **there is the danger that reprocessing plants could be used by a host nation to initiate a nuclear weapons program. This has already happened in the case of India.** **The United States sold reprocessing technology to India with the understanding that it would only be used for civilian nuclear power. The plutonium product**, however, **was diverted for military purposes.** **After the detonation of an Indian bomb in 1974, the United States reversed its pro-reprocessing stance and put an end to domestic civilian reprocessing**. Although reprocessing is no longer technically outlawed in the United States, **a de facto ban has persisted**.

In response to proliferation concerns, **many reprocessing advocates recommend a new method,** called COEX, for future reprocessing facilities. In contrast to the current PUREX process, which produces pure plutonium oxide, COEX would extract plutonium and uranium together to form a mixed plutonium-uranium oxide that can be directly fabricated into MOX fuel. Although this product cannot fuel bombs directly, **a malicious organization could** later **extract the plutonium. Since none of the MOX components are highly radioactive, plutonium separation could be carried out safely in a standard chemical laboratory with existing methods**. **Even more worrisome, the separation process need not be efficient to obtain a large quantity of material because the COEX product is composed of 50 percent plutonium**. In addition, **because COEX has never been deployed on an industrial scale, the costs of developing it commercially could be massive. In combination with the unknown operating and environmental costs, COEX is a big gamble for little gain.**

***Once through cycle is far safer and more resistant***

**Lyman & Hippel 08**—Edwin Lyman is a senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program. Frank N. von Hippel is a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. April 2008, Arms Control Association, Reprocessing Revisited:The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership, <http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_04/LymanVonHippel>, jj

**Proliferation resistance is determined by several different properties of a fuel cycle system**. One is how easily a non-nuclear-weapon state that is a party to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) could covertly obtain weapons-usable material from a facility subject to International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards. Another is how quickly such a country could use a facility to obtain significant quantities of weapons-usable material should it decide to break out of its NPT constraints. A third is how easily a subnational group could divert or steal weapons-usable material.

**It is not easy** by any of these routes **to get plutonium from a once-through cycle in which spent nuclear fuel is stored and eventually emplaced in a geologic repository.** **A typical spent fuel assembly is a large object weighing approximately half a ton and containing a low concentration** (around 1 percent) **of plutonium, diluted by uranium and mixed with fission products, some of which generate a lethal field of gamma rays** (higher-energy versions of X-rays). **Because of this radiation field, extracting plutonium from spent fuel is a difficult undertaking, requiring remotely controlled operations behind meter-thick walls.**

In contrast, **plutonium that has been separated from spent fuel by the PUREX process emits such a low level of penetrating radiation that a person could carry a bomb’s worth** (less than eight kilograms) **in lightweight containers without incurring a radiation dose high enough to cause severe injury in the near term**. (Even a small radiation dose brings with it a slightly increased chance of cancer in the long term.) **The IAEA currently considers nuclear material “self-protecting” if the radiation dose rate one meter away is at least one Sievert per hour** (100 rems/hour).[12] **The gamma and neutron dose rate from a 50-year-old spent fuel assembly containing five kilograms of plutonium would be about 10 Sieverts/hour while that from a kilogram of separated plutonium is about one million times lower. It is therefore far easier to divert separated plutonium to a national or subnational weapons program than it is to divert and separate the plutonium in a spent fuel assembly.**

**Keeping the transuranic elements americium and curium mixed with plutonium in pyroprocessing would increase its radiation dose a hundred-fold but only to a level that would still be one thousand times lower than the IAEA’s self-protection standard.[13]**

**It is also relatively easy in the once-through fuel cycle to keep track of spent fuel assemblies. In contrast, the IAEA has conceded that material accountancy alone cannot effectively detect national diversion of weapons-useable quantities of plutonium at large reprocessing facilities because of the huge throughputs of plutonium involved and the inaccuracies of plutonium measurement.** **Pyroprocessing is even more problematic in this regard because the higher radiation levels and inhomogeneous mixture being processed render it even more difficult to measure accurately the plutonium in the process.[14]**

Finally, **the stockpiling of large quantities of separated plutonium in a fuel cycle involving reprocessing would result in a breakout time for nuclear weapons production far shorter than for the once-through fuel cycle case**. **The same would be true for a pyroprocessing plant.** Indeed, **a** 1992 **study** commissioned jointly by the Departments of Energy and State **showed a variety of ways to use a pyroprocessing plant to produce relatively pure plutonium.**[15]

Thus, **although pyroprocessing does produce a mixture that is more radioactive than the pure plutonium produced by PUREX, the difference is not great enough to justify claims that it is significantly more proliferation resistant and certainly not great enough to justify assertions by some U.S. officials that “pyroprocessing is not reprocessing**.” In any case, PUREX is the wrong standard for comparison. For the United States and South Korea, which are jointly pursuing pyroprocessing research and development, **pyroprocessing should be compared with their current practice of simply storing the spent fuel**. In that context, ***pyroprocessing appears anything but proliferation resistant.***

Pyroprocessing is designed to treat metal fuel for liquid sodium-cooled reactors and is not optimal for the ceramic uranium-oxide fuel used by LWRs that are standard in the world today. Consequently, the Energy Department’s reprocessing research and development program has focused instead on a family of technologies related to PUREX that are more suited for reprocessing uranium-oxide fuel. They are called UREX+ (uranium extraction-plus). As with pyroprocessing, the plutonium would be mixed with various other transuranic elements.[16] The department’s current preference is to use a UREX+ variant that keeps plutonium mixed only with uranium and neptunium.[17] Neptunium is a weapons-usable isotope that is less radioactive than plutonium. **Adding it to plutonium therefore would not decrease at all the attractiveness of the mixture for weapon purposes. Also, the uranium dilutant could be separated out with very simple chemical processing.**

The Global Nuclear Energy Partnership

In reaction to the Bush administration’s growing interest in restarting a reprocessing industry in the United States, **many critics expressed concern about the impact of such an initiative on U.S. efforts to discourage non-nuclear-weapon states from separating out plutonium**. The Bush administration’s answer was to embed the new U.S. reprocessing and recycle program in GNEP, unveiled in February 2006. In rolling out the initiative, Bush announced that:

America will work with nations that have advanced civilian nuclear energy programs, such as France, Japan, and Russia [to] develop and deploy innovative advanced reactors and new methods to recycle spent nuclear fuel. As these technologies are developed, we will work with our partners to help developing countries meet their growing energy needs [and] ensure that these developing countries have a reliable nuclear fuel supply. In exchange, these countries would agree to…forego uranium enrichment and reprocessing activities that can be used to develop nuclear weapons.[18]

As already noted, however, sending spent fuel abroad to be reprocessed has proven unattractive unless the reprocessing country keeps the radioactive waste. France and the United Kingdom have found that to be politically impossible; the United States almost certainly would as well. The White House therefore hoped that Russia would be able to reprocess the spent fuel and keep the nuclear wastes of countries without reprocessing plants.[19] Several years ago, the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy was interested in doing just this and succeeded, despite massive public opposition, in getting the Russian Duma to pass a law making it legal. In November 2005, however, the helm of Russia’s nuclear establishment, now called Rosatom, was taken over by Sergey Kirienko, a former prime minister, who proved to be less willing to ignore public opinion on this matter. Two months after the Energy Department unveiled GNEP, a Rosatom spokesperson indicated that, apart from a continuing willingness to take back spent fuel produced from nuclear fuel and nuclear reactors that it had supplied, Rosatom was no longer interested in taking other countries’ spent fuel.[20]

The Energy Department was unfazed. In parallel to its efforts to form an industrial coalition to support reprocessing, it launched an effort to form a coalition of countries committed to a GNEP Statement of Principles that includes the development and demonstration of “advanced technologies for recycling spent fuel for deployment in facilities that do not separate pure plutonium.” The principles statement reassures countries that they “would not give up any rights” if they join the partnership.[21] Although the rights in question are not explicitly specified, the countries that insisted on the inclusion of this language, including Australia, Canada, Kazakhstan, South Africa, and Ukraine, made clear that they would not give up their rights to acquire national enrichment plants.[22] South Korea has also expressed an interest in acquiring a reprocessing plant. Thus, in part at least because of the Energy Department’s tireless proselytizing, the United States has been pushed back from one of GNEP’s original rationales, to persuade countries that do not already have full-scale commercial enrichment or reprocessing plants to abstain from developing them.

As of February 29, 2008, 20 countries in addition to the United States had signed up as GNEP partners. Of these, 16 are non-nuclear-weapon states of which one-half do not yet have nuclear power plants. Of those partners that are non-nuclear-weapon states and do have nuclear power plants, all but one (Japan) have never reprocessed or have ended their reprocessing contracts with Russia.

***It is difficult to see any nonproliferation rationale in the United States persuading 15 non-nuclear-weapon states to choose reprocessing over a once-through fuel cycle.***

### Defense

***They don’t solve the motivation for prolif***

**Friedman ‘12**

George Friedman, 9-11-12, STRATFOR, War and Bluff: Iran, Israel and the United States <http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/war-and-bluff-iran-israel-and-united-states?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120911&utm_term=gweekly&utm_content=title&elq=a8288f444a084a1bad25aa86615854c0>, jj

**From the Iranian point of view, a nuclear program has been extremely valuable**. **Having one has brought Iran prestige in the Islamic world and has given it a level of useful global political credibility.** As with North Korea, **having a nuclear program has allowed Iran to sit as an equal with the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council plus Germany, creating a psychological atmosphere in which Iran's willingness merely to talk to the Americans, British, French, Russians, Chinese and Germans represented a concession**. Though it has positioned the Iranians extremely well politically, the nuclear program also has triggered sanctions that have caused Iran substantial pain. But **Iran has prepared for sanctions for years, building a range of corporate, banking and security mechanisms to evade their most devastating impact. Having countries like Russia and China unwilling to see Iran crushed has helped. *Iran can survive sanctions.***

***Mid East prolif is slow***

**Riedel & Samore, 2008** [Bruce and Gary, Senior Fellow in foreign policy at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy of the Brookings Institution;vice president, director of studies, and Maurice R. Greenberg chair at the Council on Foreign Relations**,** CFR, "Managing Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East.”]

Most recently, Syria’s efforts to build a secret research reactor with North Korean assistance—as a counter to Israel’s nuclear capabilities— were abruptly terminated by an Israeli air raid in September 2007. Even though a number of Arab states have announced plans to revive or initiate nuclear power programs, none of these states has the scientific and industrial infrastructure or the skilled human capital to advance quickly, even with a crash program. Moreover, none of the established nuclear suppliers is prepared to export fuel-cycle technology or facilities to the region. In these circumstances, the only near-term option for an Arab country is to seek to purchase nuclear material or weapons from another state. At least one state probably has already set the diplomatic basis for doing so: Saudi Arabia with Pakistan.

***Middle East prolif doesn’t cause nuclear war***

**Rijpkema ‘10**(Marisa Kushner, B.A. – Government, Strategy, Diplomacy, George Washington University November, “Should Israel Alter its Policy of Nuclear Ambiguity?” proquest, jj)

Furthermore, some experts assert **that a nuclearized Middle East would not necessarily become the location of the world’s first nuclear war**. This is based on the viewpoint **that there is a vast gap between the language used by Middle Eastern leaders, which often incorporates extreme rhetoric, and their actual behavior. As such, there is no clear indication that Arab leaders are irrational or would use nuclear weapons on a whim, and it possible that Arab leaders would remain sensitive to the costs of using nuclear weapons.**102

# 1nr

## russia

### rels high

#### His snapshot args are backwards --- our ev says US – Russia relations high now--- Kerry smoothed over relations --- cooperation on 28 things now --- like arms control & iran --- don’t buy their ev --- the media only focuses on disputes, ignores coop --- that’s Morrison & china daily

#### Relations high

Gvosdev, 3/1/13 (Nikolas, former editor of the National Interest and a frequent foreign policy commentator in both the print and broadcast media, currently on the faculty of the U.S. Naval War College, “The Realist Prism: Can Kerry Salvage the Russia Reset?” http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12756/the-realist-prism-can-kerry-salvage-the-russia-reset, bgm)

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov had what sources are describing as constructive talks in their first face-to-face meeting in Berlin since Kerry was confirmed as Hillary Clinton's replacement. While there were no major breakthroughs on any of the contentious issues in the U.S.-Russia bilateral relationship, the two men seemed to establish the basis for a good working relationship. This will be important if any vestige of the Obama administration's reset of relations with Russia is to endure, given the lack of any strong personal connection between Russian President Vladimir Putin and U.S. President Barack Obama.

#### They’re cooperating on a ton of issues

Real Times 2/3/2013 (“Putin, Obama stress cooperation, pledge to ‘avoid deterioration’ in relations”. <http://rt.com/news/putin-obama-bilateral-relations-704/>) [nagel]

Russia and the US agreed to avoid “negative steps” that could threaten bilateral relations as the two countries' presidents held their first [phone](http://rt.com/news/putin-obama-bilateral-relations-704/) conversation since Barack Obama's re-election. "The leaders of both countries are united in their desire to avoid any steps that could negatively reflect on bilateral relations," the Kremlin said in a statement following the phone conversation, which was initiated by President Obama. Russian President Vladimir Putin and his American counterpart discussed a wide range of issues, paying special attention to the situation in the Middle East - particularly in Syria, the Kremlin said. "The leaders agreed to cooperate closely on 'hot' international issues related to Syria, Middle East [settlements](http://rt.com/news/putin-obama-bilateral-relations-704/), Iran, North Korea and plans in the field of anti-missile defense," the Kremlin's press service announced. The press service said Putin reaffirmed his invitation to Obama for an official visit to Russia. Putin and Obama agreed to hold a bilateral talk on the sidelines of the G8 summit in Northern Ireland, set for June 17 and 18. The two leaders made the pledge to work closely on a "mutually beneficial relationship," agreeing that the partnership between the two countries “has principal significance for ensuring stability in the world.” Touching upon the situation in war-torn Syria, President Putin stressed “the need to put an end to military activity as soon as possible.” The two presidents tasked Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and US Secretary of State John Kerry with working out new initiatives to resolve the ongoing conflict in Syria.

#### Russia says no

Bohm, 10/19/12 (Michael, Putin's Pride Has No Price Tag, The Moscow times, Read more: <http://www.themoscowtimes.com/opinion/article/putins-pride-has-no-price-tag/469977.html#ixzz2BxhV2pBW>)

First, the Foreign Ministry announced that USAID must leave Russia by Oct. 1. Then, early last week, the ministry said UNICEF, the United Nations children’s agency, must wrap up its existing programs by the end of the year. Several days later, the ministry announced that Russia will discontinue its participation in the U.S.-funded Nunn-Lugar program, which over the past 20 years spent $8 billion to help Russia dismantle and destroy its extraneous nuclear missiles, warheads and submarines as well as old stockpiles of chemical and biological weapons.

In all three demarches, the Kremlin has sent a clear message to the United States: Russia no longer needs U.S. help because President [Vladimir Putin](http://www.themoscowtimes.com/mt_profile/vladimir_putin/432538.html) has turned the country into a self-sufficient global power.

## Impact

### 1NR Overview --- Deficit

***Heg outweighs --- solves extinction***

**Barnett**, Professor, Warfare Analysis and Research Dept – U.S. Naval War College, 3/7/’**11**

(Thomas, “The New Rules: Leadership Fatigue Puts U.S., and Globalization, at Crossroads,” )

Let me be more blunt: **As the guardian of globalization, the U.S. military has been the greatest force for peace the world has ever known. Had America been removed from the global dynamics that governed the 20th century, the mass murder never would have ended.** Indeed, **it's entirely conceivable there would now be no identifiable hu~~man~~ civilization left, once nuclear weapons entered the killing equation. But the world did not keep sliding down that path of perpetual war. Instead, America stepped up and changed everything by ushering in our now-perpetual great-power peace.** We introduced the international liberal trade order known as globalization and played loyal Leviathan over its spread. What resulted was the collapse of empires, an explosion of democracy, the persistent spread of human rights, the liberation of women, the doubling of life expectancy, a roughly 10-fold increase in adjusted global GDP and a profound and persistent reduction in battle deaths from state-based conflicts.

***Turns every scenario***

Robert **Kagan** is a senior fellow in Foreign Policy at Brookings. His most recent book is "The World America Made." 3-14-**12**, America has made the world freer, safer and wealthier, CNN, <http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/14/opinion/kagan-world-america-made/index.html?hpt=hp_c2>, jj

(CNN) -- **We take a lot for granted about the way the world looks today** -- the widespread **freedom, the unprecedented global prosperity** (even despite the current economic crisis), ***and the absence of war among great powers.* In 1941 there were only a dozen democracies in the world. Today there are more than 100. For four centuries prior to 1950, global GDP rose by less than 1 percent a year. Since 1950 it has risen by an average of 4 percent a year, and billions of people have been lifted out of poverty. The first half of the 20th century saw the two most destructive wars in the history of mankind, and in prior centuries war among great powers was almost constant. But for the past 60 years no great powers have gone to war. This is the world America made when it assumed global leadership** after World War II. Would this world order survive if America declined as a great power? **Some American intellectuals insist that a "Post-American" world need not look very different from the American world and that all we need to do is "manage" American decline**. ***But that is wishful thinking*. If the balance of power shifts in the direction of other powers, the world order will inevitably change to suit their interests and preferences. Take the issue of democracy**. For several decades, the balance of power in the world has favored democratic governments. **In a genuinely post-American world, the balance would shift toward the great power autocracies. Both China and Russia already protect dictators like** Syria's Bashar al-**Assad**. **If they gain greater relative influence in the future, we will see fewer democratic transitions and more autocrats hanging on to power. What about the free market, free trade economic order?** **People assume China and other rising powers that have benefited so much from the present system would have a stake in preserving it**. They wouldn't kill the goose that lays the golden eggs. **But China's form of capitalism is heavily dominated by the state, with the ultimate goal being preservation of the ruling party. Although the Chinese have been beneficiaries of an open international economic order, they could end up undermining it simply because, as an autocratic society, their priority is to preserve the state's control of wealth and the power it brings**. They might kill the goose because they can't figure out how to keep both it and themselves alive. **Finally, what about the long peace that has held among the great powers** for the better part of six decades? Many people imagine that American predominance will be replaced by some kind of multipolar harmony. But **multipolar systems have historically been neither stable nor peaceful. War among the great powers was a** common, if not **constant, occurrence in the long periods of multipolarity in the 16th, 17th, and 18th centuries. The 19th century was notable for** two stretches of great-power peace of roughly four decades each, punctuated, however, by **major wars among great powers** and **culminating in World War I, the most destructive and deadly war mankind had known** up to that point. ***The era of American predominance has shown that there is no better recipe for great-power peace than certainty about who holds the upper hand.*** **Many people view the present international order as the inevitable result of human progress**, a combination of advancing science and technology, an increasingly global economy, strengthening international institutions, evolving "norms" of international behavior, and the gradual but inevitable triumph of liberal democracy over other forms of government -- forces of change that transcend the actions of men and nations. But **there was nothing inevitable about the world that was created after World War II. International order is not an evolution; it is an imposition. It is the domination of one vision over others -- in America's case, the domination of liberal free market principles of economics, democratic principles of politics, and a peaceful international system that supports these, over other visions that other nations and peoples may have. The present order will last only as long as those who favor it and benefit from it retain the will and capacity to defend it. If and when American power declines, the institutions and norms American power has supported** will decline, too. Or they **may collapse** altogether **as we transition into** another kind of world order, or into **disorder**. **We may discover then that the United States was essential to keeping the present world order together and that the alternative to American power was not peace and harmony but chaos and catastrophe -- which was what the world looked like right before the American order came into being.**

### Turns Prolif

#### Turns prolif

Stephen Peter **Rosen** (PhD from Harvard University in 1979 and is currently the Beton Michael Kaneb Professor of National Security and Military Affairs in the Department of Government, Harvard University) Spring **2003** “An Empire, If you Can Keep It,” The National Interest, , LN Academic, UK: Fisher

Rather than wrestle with such difficult and unpleasant problems, the United States could give up the imperial mission, or pretensions to it, now. This would essentially mean the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from the Middle East, Europe and mainland Asia. It may be that all other peoples, without significant exception, will then turn to their own affairs and leave the United States alone. But those who are hostile to us might remain hostile, and be much less afraid of the United States after such a withdrawal. Current friends would feel less secure and, in the most probable post-imperial world, would revert to the logic of self-help in which all states do what they must to protect themselves. This would imply the relatively rapid acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Iran, Iraq and perhaps Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Malaysia, Indonesia and others. Constraints on the acquisition of biological weapons would be even weaker than they are today. Major regional arms races would also be very likely throughout Asia and the Middle East. This would not be a pleasant world for Americans, or anyone else. It is difficult to guess what the costs of such a world would be to the United States. They would probably not put the end of the United States in prospect, but they would not be small. If the logic of American empire is unappealing, it is not at all clear that the alternatives are that much more attractive.

### Turns Russia

***Turns russia***

**Thayer, 07** – Associate Professor in the Department of Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University (Bradley A., American Empire, Routledge, page 42)

Peace, like good health, is not often noticed, but certainly is missed when absent. Throughout history, peace and stability have been a major benefit of empires. In fact, pax Romana in Latin means the Roman peace, or the stabil-ity brought about by the Roman Empire. Rome’s power was so overwhelming that no one could challenge it successfully for hundreds of years. The result was stability within the Roman Empire. Where Rome conquered, peace, law, order, education, a common language, and much else followed. That was true of the British Empire (pax Britannica) too.

So it is with the United States today. Peace and stability are major benefits of the American Empire. The fact that America is so powerful actually reduces the likelihood of major war. Scholars of international politics have found that the presence of a dominant state in international politics actually reduces the likelihood of war because weaker states, including even great powers, know that it is unlikely that they could challenge the dominant state and win. They may resort to other mechanisms or tactics to challenge the dominant coun-try, but are unlikely to do so directly. This means that there will be no wars between great powers. At least, not until a challenger (certainly China) thinks it can overthrow the dominant state (the United States). But there will be intense security competition—both China and the United States will watch each other closely, with their intelligence communities increasingly focused on each other, their diplomats striving to ensure that countries around the world do not align with the other, and their militaries seeing the other as their principal threat. This is not unusual in international politics but, in fact, is its “normal” condition. Americans may not pay much attention to it until a crisis occurs. But right now states are competing with one another. This is because international politics does not sleep; it never takes a rest.

**Turns Nuclear**

***Turns nuclear***

**Hoskin Davis 08** Management Consulting Firm, provides strategic workforce planning, change management and executive search services, “Staffing the Nuclear Renaissance” online, jj

It is generally believed that over the next twenty years **demographic trends will produce a serious personnel supply-demand gap in the developed world, particularly in the United States. We have been studying the situation in the nuclear power industry, which is poised for a renaissance**. This industry provides an interesting case study of what other industries may face and what kinds of solutions they should embrace.

The **nuclear power talent supply constraints are caused by several factors**. **First and foremost is the aging workforce as the baby boom generation nears retirement. Birth rates in developed countries have been historically low. There has been a softening in our educational system’s emphasis on math and science education and lower enrollments in these majors relative to, say, the days of the space race.**

In addition, **cultural trends have emphasized the virtues of a four-year college degree and de-emphasized the importance of technical and craft careers. Plumbers, mechanics, welders, pipe-fitters, electricians, construction workers, and the like are not viewed as great occupations, even though the pay rates are very substantial**. **Finally, in spite of the forces propelling immigration,** **security concerns since 9/11 have created real restrictions on the international movement of labor, particularly for high-security endeavors such as nuclear plant construction.**

***Turns terorrism***

**McLarty 9** (Thomas F. III, President – McLarty Associates and Former White House Chief of Staff and Task Force Co-Chair, “U.S. Immigration Policy: Report of a CFR-Sponsored Independent Task Force”, 7-8, http://www.cfr.org/ publication/19759/us\_immigration\_policy.html)

We have seen, when you look at the table of the top 20 firms that are H1-B visa requestors, at least 15 of those are IT firms. And as we're seeing across industry, much of the hardware and software that's used in this country is not only manufactured now overseas, but it's developed overseas by scientists and engineers who were educated here in the United States.

We're seeing a lot more activity around cyber-security, certainly noteworthy attacks here very recently. It's becoming an increasingly dominant set of requirements across not only to the Department of Defense, but the Department of Homeland Security and the critical infrastructure that's held in private hands. Was there any discussion or any interest from DOD or DHS as you undertook this review on the security things about what can be done to try to generate a more effective group of IT experts here in the United States, many of which are coming to the U.S. institutions, academic institutions from overseas and often returning back? This potentially puts us at a competitive disadvantage going forward.

MCLARTY: Yes. And I think your question largely is the answer as well. I mean, clearly we have less talented students here studying -- or put another way, more talented students studying in other countries that are gifted, talented, really have a tremendous ability to develop these kind of technology and scientific advances, we're going to be put at an increasingly disadvantage. Where if they come here -- and I kind of like Dr. Land's approach of the green card being handed to them or carefully put in their billfold or purse as they graduate -- then, obviously, that's going to strengthen, I think, our system, our security needs.

## Flow

### Internal Link Ext – Immigration solves deficit

***Yes – solves defecit --- their ev is about unskilled immigratnts --- but our ev is about high skilled immigration --- CIR solves the deficit quickly and painlessly***

**Holen 11/23** Ms. Holen, a senior fellow at the Technology Policy Institute, is a former official of the Congressional Budget Office and the White House Office of Management and Budget. 11-23-12, Real Clear Markets, Immigration Reform Is a Painless Way to Reduce Deficit, <http://www.realclearmarkets.com/articles/2012/11/23/immigration_reform_is_a_painless_way_to_reduce_deficit_100002.html>, jj

The automatic spending cuts, divided between defense and domestic discretionary expenditures, were part of the budget deal agreed to in 2011 to avoid default on the nation's debt. As part of the deal, a supercommittee was to develop a more palatable plan to achieve the same deficit reduction. As everyone knows, the supercommittee was unsuccessful - for an understandable reason. **Deficit reduction** - cutting expenditures and raising taxes - **typically involves pain** for some significant constituency. **Occasionally**, however, **one finds a way to reduce the deficit that avoids pain. Letting in more high-skilled immigrants is one such way. Admitting more workers with skills in** science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (**STEM fields) can make a substantial contribution toward needed deficit reduction without raising taxes or cutting spending, while at the same time boosting growth and productivity.**

A study I prepared for the Technology Policy Institute shows that **proposals considered by Congress to loosen green card and temporary worker constraints for high-skilled workers would reduce the deficit on the order of $100 billion over ten years** - almost 10 percent of the $1.2 trillion needed to avoid automatic spending cuts. **This result is primarily due to the increased tax revenues from the earnings of new high-skilled workers, even without touching tax rates or deductions because the nation's resource base would be thereby enlarged**. Think of the Louisiana Purchase as an example-of expanding the nation's human capital rather than land capital.

My study uses the same modeling and scoring approach used by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) for comprehensive immigration reform. **CBO concluded that increased output and tax revenues would result from the addition of significant labor resources to the economy.**

Although President **Obama** has yet to recommend legislation in this area, he **has signaled his strong support**: "Today, there are hundreds of thousands of students excelling in our schools who are not American citizens...As soon as they obtain advanced degrees, we send them back home to compete against us. It makes no sense," the president said. Half of all students in mathematics, engineering, and the sciences at U.S. universities are foreign-born. **We are effectively exporting valuable human capital resources that were acquired at considerable national expense.**

**Admitting more high-skilled immigrants has bipartisan support**. For example, last spring, the Startup Act 2.0, sponsored by Democratic Senators Mark Warner (VA) and Chris Coons (DE), and Republican Senators Marco Rubio (FL) and Jerry Moran (KS), proposed providing a green card to graduates with a master's degree or a PhD in STEM fields. The proposal would also create a new entrepreneur's visa for immigrants who launch businesses.

Some worry that foreigners would displace American workers and reduce their wages. But most studies find negligible wage effects, particularly when the newcomers hold advanced degrees. Secondary, positive effects on wages also result because immigrants, both as workers and consumers, stimulate the demand for investment capital and encourage domestic workers to invest in more education.

**It is rare that such a "win-win" is available - a policy that is good for the economy, and at the same time would make a substantial contribution toward needed deficit reduction without either raising taxes or cutting spending**. When one does become available **we should grab it.**

## UQ

### 1NR UQ Wall

#### Immigration will pass now, but it’s a fight --- extend Buchanan --- they’re bipart support and compromise now, but it’s not a done deal.

#### Political capital’s key and creates momentum --- that’s Anniston Star --- prefer the direction of the link --- Obama aggressive stance is causing the GOP to cave now --- his behind-the-scenes push keeps them at the negotiating table and ensures passage

Overcomes resistance

Their ev not conclusive wont pass

Shifter 12/27 Michael is the President of Inter-American Dialogue. “Will Obama Kick the Can Down the Road?” 2012, http://www.thedialogue.org/page.cfm?pageID=32&pubID=3186

Not surprisingly, Obama has been explicit that reforming the US’s shameful and broken immigration system will be a top priority in his second term. There is every indication that he intends to use some of his precious political capital – especially in the first year – to push for serious change. The biggest lesson of the last election was that the “Latino vote” was decisive. No one doubts that it will be even more so in future elections. During the campaign, many Republicans -- inexplicably -- frightened immigrants with offensive rhetoric. But the day after the election, there was talk, in both parties, of comprehensive immigration reform. ¶ Despite the sudden optimism about immigration reform, there is, of course, no guarantee that it will happen. It will require a lot of negotiation and deal-making. Obama will have to invest a lot of his time and political capital -- twisting some arms, even in his own party. Resistance will not disappear.

#### Immigration will pass.

CT POST 3/28/13 Connecticut Post http://www.ctpost.com/local/article/Immigration-reform-gaining-support-in-Congress-4393187.php

A Republican Party in desperate search for relevance to Latino voters. An expanded Democratic advantage in the Senate. A second-term President with his legacy on the line.

Does all that add up to enough to break decades of impasse and produce comprehensive immigration reform? As expectations -- and tensions -- rise, the answer won't be long in coming.

A bipartisan bill could be filed in the Senate as early as next week, followed in relatively short order by a House bill, also crafted by a bipartisan group, aiming at a compromise on the key issue of citizenship.

The efforts are being applauded by President Barack Obama, who is using every ounce of his political clout to try to get comprehensive reform.

Obama said the time has come "to work up the political courage to do what's required to be done."

"I expect a bill to be put forward. I expect a debate to begin next month. I want to sign that bill into law as soon as possible," Obama said at a White House naturalization ceremony.

In addition to the issue of eventual citizenship for 11 million undocumented immigrants, Congress is expected to address the need for temporary or guest worker programs.

Congress last passed comprehensive bipartisan reform legislation in 1986, when President Ronald Reagan signed a law that granted citizenship to several million undocumented immigrants and created a guest worker program.

Up until now, Republicans have opposed citizenship programs as an "amnesty" for lawbreakers who entered the country illegally, and labor has chafed at guest worker programs.

But Republican losses in the 2012 elections and increased public support for reform have many in the GOP talking compromise.

"If there is one issue that the two parties could produce something meaningful on in this Congress, it would be immigration," said Stephen Hess, a political expert at The Brookings Institution.

Hess said an eventual bill "will have lots of provisos, and it will go back and forth, but it would be hard not to produce something given the general feeling that something has to be produced."

More and more Republicans are moving toward immigration-reform measures as the party seeks to reach out to Latinos, the nation's largest -- and growing -- minority voting bloc.

Public opinion is behind them.

A recent poll showed 63 percent of Americans supported a path to citizenship for undocumented workers provided they meet certain requirements, according to a survey by the Public Religion Research Institute.

Notable Republicans who have recently spoken in favor of compromise on citizenship proposals include Sen. Rand Paul, R-Ky.; former Mississippi Gov. Haley Barbour; and Rep. Paul Ryan, R-Wis.

And a March report by the National Republican Committee, considered a "post mortem" on the 2012 elections, recommended the GOP embrace comprehensive immigration reform to shore up its shaky standing with minorities -- Latinos, in particular.

Roy Beck, executive director of Numbers USA, which advocates lower numerical numbers on immigration, predicted a majority of Republican senators would oppose citizenship.

Groups like Numbers USA are working to hold GOP senators in line. They sent 13,000 emails to Kentucky voters that claimed Paul's position was "more radical and pro-immigration than anything proposed by President Obama."

The group has targeted Sen. Lindsey Graham, R-S.C., one of the "Gang of Eight" senators writing the Senate bipartisan bill, as a lawmaker who favors foreign workers over unemployed South Carolinians.

Democrats from conservative-leaning states could also feel political heat.

Beck said if five to 10 Democrats in the Senate oppose a bill, proponents would need 10 to 15 Republicans to reach the 60 votes needed to cut off debate and vote on legislation.

"You do the math," Beck said.

In 2007, an effort to cut off debate on a Senate immigration reform bill died on a 46-53 vote.

But immigrant reform proponents, such as America's Voice, say there is a "tectonic shift" in the GOP, and the Democrats also have expanded their Senate majority to 53-45, plus two independents who caucus with them. They predict the Senate will muster the votes necessary to pass a reform bill.

Still, it won't be easy.

#### GOP coming around

E News Park Forest 3-19-13, New GOP Embrace of Comprehensive Immigration Reform is Overdue but Welcome News to Representative Gutierrez, <http://www.enewspf.com/latest-news/latest-local/41326-new-gop-embrace-of-comprehensive-immigration-reform-is-overdue-but-welcome-news-to-representative-gutierrez.html>, jj

Rep. Luis V. Gutierrez (D-IL), a long-time champion of immigration reform who has frequently worked across party lines, welcomed the new direction of the GOP and said he is already seeing the new approach in practice. He just completed a three-city tour of California over the weekend, holding packed, enthusiastic events to build support for immigration reform in San Diego, Salinas and San Francisco (See Facebook Note: Gutierrez Travels The County To Build Support for Comprehensive Immigration Reform). ¶ The following is a statement by Rep. Gutierrez, a Member of the House Judiciary Committee and the Chairman of the Task Force on Immigration of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus:¶ "The politics on immigration have evolved so quickly since Election Day in the GOP that it makes your head spin. They were committed to driving 11 million undocumented immigrants, mostly Latinos, out of the country through "self-deportation" and self-destructive Arizona-style anti-immigrant laws. That was not only what their presidential candidate embraced, it was in the party platform. ¶ "Elections are powerful things. Now the GOP sees that unless they stop talking about kicking millions of Latino immigrants and their families out of our country, they cannot effectively talk to Latinos about anything else. It is good to have the GOP back at the table discussing how to resolve a tough policy problem, conscientiously, seriously, and not just thinking how to exploit this division at election time. Right now, we need to forget about who is going to get credit and have both parties serve the people's interest by getting immigration reform done.¶ "I see this change in every conversation I have with Republicans on the Hill. I see it in the Immigration Subcommittee chaired by Rep. Trey Gowdy (R-SC). We are talking about how to legalize hard working immigrants who have lived here for years or decades and how to keep their families together. We are no longer arguing with the opponents of legal immigration in the GOP Caucus who have driven the Republican position on immigration for decades and led them off an electoral and demographic cliff.¶ "There are a lot of reasons for optimism that Congress will pass immigration reform this year and the return of reasonable Republicans to the table is one of them."

#### Obama has enough PC now

Beatriz González¶ Staff Writer, 2-27-13, The Bottom Line, Jorge Castañeda Expresses Views on Immigration at Campbell Hall, <http://thebottomline.as.ucsb.edu/2013/02/jorge-castaneda-expresses-views-on-immigration-at-campbell-hall>, jj

***Quoting Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs of Mexico Jorge Castañeda***

Consequently, Castañeda believes that current immigration policies entail multiple problems. If the policies are sources of social, political, and human rights related inconveniences, why has the U.S. done nothing? Castañeda provided two main reasons: firstly, at the beginning of his first candidature, Obama focused on regulating healthcare; secondly, he claimed, American politicians have always procrastinated dealing with immigration policy. However, Castañeda thinks that now is the only possible moment to amend legislation in the direction he desires.¶ “Obama has enough political capital to have the immigration reform done this year,” he said. “Next year, representatives will be already fighting for re-election.”

### PC High

**Honeymoon isn’t over—small data sampling—still has momentum**

**Sullivan 3/8/13—covers national politics for “The Fix.” Former Editor of Hotline On Call, National Journal Hotline’s politics blog.** [Sean Sullivan, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-fix/wp/2013/03/08/why-its-too-early-to-declare-the-end-of-obamas-post-election-honeymoon/]

Why it’s too soon to declare the end of Obama’s post-election honeymoon

Polling data released in recent days suggested that President Obama’s post-election honeymoon may well have come to an end. But a review of a wide cross-section of polling conducted over the last few months suggests it’s **too early** to declare Obama the honeymoon over just yet.

Here’s the bottom line: There are data points that should worry the president and his top advisers. But across the board, his numbers haven’t exactly dive-bombed.

There are two polls that that have shown signs of trouble for the president:

\* Obama’s approval rating (45 percent) in a Quinnipiac University survey released Thursday was virtually unchanged from his approval rating a month ago (46 percent). But it is down from early December, when 53 percent of voters approved of the job the president was doing, a month after his re-election win.

\* According to Gallup, which tracks Obama’s approval rating among Americans based on a three-day rolling average, Obama’s number is now hovering around the high 40s, down from the low 50s where it stood in the months leading up to last week’s failure to avert the deep federal spending cuts known as sequestration.

How do those numbers stack up against the rest of the post-election polling that has been conducted? Obama’s job approval rating hasn’t dropped as severely in other surveys:

So what does this all suggest? A couple of things. For starters, we need to see more post-sequestration polling numbers (the cuts kicked into effect last weekend) to get a better sense of what the cuts ultimately mean for Obama’s political standing. Second, Obama’s hasn’t lost all of the momentum he picked up post-election. While the president has been embroiled in high-profile fiscal standoffs with Congressional Republicans, the **fights haven’t done serious damage to his brand.**

It’s important to note that the outcome of the first fiscal battle, over the fiscal cliff, turned out much better for Obama than the second one, over sequestration. He largely got what he wanted in the deal to avert the cliff, as Republicans agreed to tax hikes on the wealthiest Americans. But on sequestration, Republicans didn’t cave into his demands for a mix of new tax revenues and alternate spending cuts — and much of the post-sequester coverage has focused on how Obama’s warnings haven’t come true.

Aside from Obama’s approval rating, there is some data that suggest signs of trouble for Obama coming out of the sequestration standoff. A CBS News poll showed nearly as many Americans blamed him (33 percent) as blamed Congressional Republicans (38 percent) for failure to avert the cuts. And last month’s NBC News/Wall Street Journal poll found only 32 percent said the country is headed in right direction, down from 41 percent in December.

As the Fix boss wrote in this space about a month ago, the lengths of post-reelection political honeymoons have grown shorter and shorter in recent years (Gallup has a comprehensive study here). Obama, who has a very ambitious legislative agenda right now, is hoping to be the exception to that trend. We’ll find out in the coming months if he can pull that off or not.

#### Obama has leverage

Amie Parnes and Justin Sink- 03/20/13, The Hill, Obama honeymoon may be over, <http://thehill.com/homenews/administration/289179-obama-honeymoon-may-be-over>, jj

And administration officials believe they still have the leverage.¶ “There’s a decent amount of momentum behind all of this,” the official said. “It looks like immigration is closer [to passage] than ever before.”

### A2: PC Not Key --- Obama Uses XO

#### Obama won’t use an XO

Lerer 2/11 Lisa Lerer, “Obama Poised to Skirt Congress to Seal Legacy in New Term Agenda,” BLOOMBERG, 2-11-2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-02-11/obama-poised-to-skirt-congress-to-seal-legacy-in-new-term-agenda.html.

The tactic carries political risk, beyond the backlash it will spark from congressional Republicans. Advisers say the president -- who already faces charges from Republicans that he is concentrating too much power in the White House -- remains cautious about getting too far ahead of public opinion. And executive orders can be overturned by a future president a lot easier than can legislation. What’s more, Obama will still need to work through Congress to deal with some of the nation’s biggest concerns, including tax and spending issues as well as any comprehensive changes in the immigration system.

#### Obama won’t do major immigration changes through XOs

Mark Krikorian, National Review Online, 8/15/12, The president’s unconstitutional DREAM amnesty gets rolling., cis.org/OpedsandArticles/DREAM-Amnesty-Begins-Krikorian-National-Review

The president knows what he’s doing is unconstitutional. We don’t have to read his mind to know this — he’s said it repeatedly. In July of last year, he told the National Council of La Raza, “The idea of doing things on my own is very tempting, I promise you, not just on immigration reform. But that’s not how our system works. That’s not how our democracy functions.” In September he told some journalists: I just have to continue to say this notion that somehow I can just change the laws unilaterally is just not true. We are doing everything we can administratively. But the fact of the matter is there are laws on the books that I have to enforce. And I think there’s been a great disservice done to the cause of getting the DREAM Act passed and getting comprehensive immigration passed by perpetrating the notion that somehow, by myself, I can go and do these things. It’s just not true.

### GO BACK FO FLOW.

### A2: No Vote/No Bill

#### PC in the short term key to long term momentum

Even if there’s no bill/vote for a while…Obama focus in the short term guarantees passage when push comes to shove

David Jackson, 2/5/13, USA Today, Obama backers: Immigration bill needs to move quickly, <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2013/02/05/obama-immigration-meeting-labor-ceos/1893071/>, jj

Backers of President Obama's immigration plan said Tuesday they need Congress to move quickly, so as not to lose political momentum gained during last year's election.

"We feel very strongly there is a sense of urgency," said Janet Murguia, president and CEO of the National Council of la Raza.

Murguia and leaders of other labor and civil rights organizations met with Obama at to discuss the status of an immigration overhaul that has become one or the president's top legislative priorities.

The president also sat down in a separate meeting with business leaders, some of whom later endorsed what Obama and aides call "comprehensive immigration reform."

Joe Echevarria, the CEO of Deloitte, said revamping the system -- including streamlined rules for foreign high-skilled workers -- would help boost the overall economy.

"It's about people becoming employed and productive," Echevarria said.

The White House sessions took place as the House Judiciary Committee conducted hearings on immigration. They also came a week before the State of the Union address, in which Obama is expected to press Congress to pass a major immigration bill this year.

Leaders of the labor and civil rights groups said they told Obama they want a pathway to citizenship for the some 11 million illegal immigrants who are already in the United States, and they want it with no strings attached.

While some Senate and House Republicans say they want to tie the pathway to specific improvements in border security, Obama's supporters said those improvements have already been made and the number of illegal crossings has fallen dramatically.

White House spokesman Jay Carney said "the president's commitment to border security has been amply demonstrated," and he wants "a clear path to citizenship for people who are affected here."

Some congressional Republicans oppose a pathway to citizenship, saying it amounts to amnesty for lawbreakers; the GOP also controls the majority in the U.S. House.

Obama and backers say they are confident Congress will pass an immigration bill in part because of last year's election, in which the president carried 71% of the Hispanic vote.

Supporters predict that Republicans will want to improve their standing with Hispanic voters by being more amenable to an immigration bill.

But that momentum could easily fade if legislation is stalled for several months, said some of the people who met with Obama, especially with the president in his second term.

"You risk more the longer you wait," Murguia said.

#### Capital now is key

Framing issue—initial bargaining determines legislative success—

Matthew N. Beckman, UC-Irvine Professor of Political Science, 2010, Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004, p. 53

To the cynic, meetings between White House officials and congressional leaders offer little more than pageantry - an opportunity to portray legislative work, not to do it. And, to be sure, sometimes these interbranch exchanges entail little more than pleasantries and pictures. However, many close observers of the presidential-congressional relationship have long cited prevoting bargaining across Pennsylvania Avenue as being substantively important. For example, discussing President Eisenhower's legislative record in 1953, CQ staffers issued a caveat they have often repeated in the years since: The President's leadership often was tested beyond the glare spot- lighting roll calls....Negotiations off the floor and action in commit- tee sometimes are as important as the recorded votes. (CQ Almanac 1953,77) Many a political scientist has agreed. Charles Jones (1994), for one, wrote, "However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation .If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally" (195)' And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, "many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and recorded by means other than roll calls ... " (68). Still, while citing earlygame processes as being potentially important, no one has yet shown how (or when) they are, much less integrated the earlygame and endgame within a unified framework. This is what I aim to accomplish here. Specifically, let me now uncover how, in addition to the familiar endgame lobbying option, presidents may also seek to exert influence in the legislative earlygame by implementing a two-pronged approach: mobilizing leading allies and deterring leading opponents.

### A2: General Thumpers – Top of Docket

#### It’s Obama’s #1 priority and will pass --- he’s pivoting away from other issues

Epstein 3-27, Jennifer Epstein is a staff writer at POLITICO. She joined POLITICO in 2010 after covering federal higher education policy, for-profit colleges and other issues related to colleges and universities for Inside Higher Ed in Washington, D.C. Before that, she followed the final months of the 2008 presidential campaign through about the 200th day of the Obama administration for Time Magazine's around-the-clock political website, The Page.¶ Epstein graduated from Princeton University in June 2008 with an A.B. in history, where she was managing editor and a reporter at The Daily Princetonian. Her senior thesis, "Slaves and Slavery at Princeton" was the first extended examination of the university's ties to slavery and won the C.O. Joline Prize for American History. She spent the summers during college working for The New York Times, Inside Higher Ed and The Journal News in White Plains, N.Y. 3/27/13, Obama renews push on immigration reform, <http://www.politico.com/politico44/2013/03/obama-renews-push-on-immigration-reform-160372.html>, jj

President Obama sought to refocus the political conversation on immigration reform Wednesday in interviews with two Spanish-language networks that come after weeks of news cycles dominated by discussions of guns, sequestration and same-sex marriage.¶ In interviews with Telemundo and Univision conducted Wednesday at the White House, the president stayed firm on the immigration reform timeline he set earlier this year and voiced confidence in the bipartisan group of eight senators who are negotiating a bill.¶ “I think we’ve seen enormous progress over the last month and a half,” Obama said in an interview with Telemundo. “I think both sides, Democrats and Republicans, have been very serious about the negotiations. I’m actually very optimistic that when they return in early April … we’ll see a bill ready to move through the process.”¶ "We're seeing right now a good, bipartisan spirit. I want to encourage that," he added on Univision. "Hopefully we'll be able to get it done."¶ The president is still holding lawmakers to the same timeline he laid out in late January, when he last sat for interviews on immigration reform. “If we have a bill introduced at the beginning of next month — as these senators indicate it will be — then I’m confident that we can get it done certainly before the end of the summer.”¶ ¶ Obama often chides Congress for being unproductive, but on immigration he still seems hopeful that the bipartisan cooperation of which he has long waxed poetic will finally come to fruition. “The most important thing is that we’re seeing a strong commitment to finally solve this problem in a way that strengthens our border security, makes sure that there’s a pathway to citizenship, an earned one, a tough one, but a pathway so that people can live out their dreams and make sure that they have a better life for themselves and their kids," he said.¶ He also reiterated that he has the option of rolling out his own bill, telling Telemundo: "I've got my own legislation, I'm prepared to step in, but I don't think that's going to be necessary."¶ Though talks between the AFL-CIO and the Chamber of Commerce over visas for low-skilled workers have been bumpy, both sides indicated Wednesday that the talks are back on. To Obama, any issues over guest workers are “resolvable," he said.¶ Nor would Obama flirt with the notion that the Senate bill might fail. “I’m not gonna presuppose failure,” he told Telemundo. “I don’t know why you keep on asking about failure, ‘cause I think this is gonna succeed. And I’m not concerned about the Democratic Party, I’m concerned about the people whose actual lives are gonna be impacted by it. And I want to make sure that they have the capacity to move forward and live out the dream of immigrants that has driven this country for so many years. I think it’s good for our economy. I think it’ll be good for these families. That’s my number-one priority.”

#### Top of the agenda

Jordan Fabian, 3-27-13, political editor for ABC News-Univision. Prior to joining Univision in 2011, he worked as a staff writer at The Hill newspaper in Washington, DC where he covered Congress and the 2012 presidential campaign. ABC News, President Obama Expects Immigration Bill In April, <http://abcnews.go.com/ABC_Univision/News/immigration-reform-obama-expects-bill-april/story?id=18825428#.UVSm_hfqnGB>, jj

President Obama expects an immigration bill to come before the Senate next month and voiced optimism that a final bill could pass through Congress this summer.¶ A bipartisan group of senators, known as the "Gang of Eight," missed a self-imposed deadline to submit a comprehensive immigration reform bill by the end of March, sparking concern that the group had reach an unsolvable impasse. But Obama said on Wednesday that the group is "actually making progress" and that they are very close to reaching a final agreement on a bill.¶ "I'm actually optimistic that when they get back they will introduce a bill," Obama said during an interview with Univision. "My sense is that they have come close and my expectation is that we'll actually see a bill on the floor of the Senate next month."¶ The president has repeatedly said that he would propose his own immigration bill should negotiations in Congress grind to a halt. But Obama refused to say that he would take such action even if the lawmakers fail to introduce a bill in April.¶ "I'm not going to presuppose that they don't [reach an agreement]," he said.¶ When Obama was asked if immigration reform could still get done by summer, a goal he set out earlier this year, the president replied, "I believe so."¶ Comprehensive immigration reform is one of Obama's top second-term priorities, and it's a rare issue where agreement between Republicans and Democrats in Washington has emerged since the November election.

#### \*\*\*Obama has priced in the rest of his agenda and will get immigration done – a new contentious topic ruins his strategy

Prefer this ev, their ev only takes into account pieces of the agenda in isolation, this ev is assumptive of whole docket

Zeleny, writer for International Herald Tribune, 1/24/2013

(Jeff, “For Obama, an ambitious agenda faces ticking clock,” Lexis)

The State of the Union address that Mr. Obama will deliver to Congress on Feb. 12 will offer the most definitive road map yet for how the White House will set priorities in his second term as well as how it intends to avoid becoming mired in a heated debate over one contentious topic to the detriment of the full agenda. ''There's no doubt you want to get off to a strong start, and we've got a pretty big dance card,'' said David Plouffe, a senior adviser to Mr. Obama who is leaving the White House this week. He ticked through a list of agenda items that included guns, immigration and fiscal issues, but he disputed the suggestion that one item would overtake the others. ''We clearly have this moment where we can get immigration done,'' Mr. Plouffe added. ''If we don't get it done, then shame on us. We've got to seize this opportunity.''

### A2: Climate/Energy

#### \*\*\*Energy and climate on the backburner

Restuccia 1/17 Andrew Restuccia is an energy reporter for POLITICO Pro. Prior to joining POLITICO, Restuccia covered energy and environmental politics and policy at The Hill. He also reported on energy policy for The Washington Independent and Inside Washington Publishers. Restuccia graduated from Syracuse University with a degree in journalism. He grew up in Massachusetts, where he got his start as an intern at the Lowell Sun. 1/17/13, Politico, Will Obama punt again on climate change?, <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/01/greens-hope-for-climate-nod-at-inauguration-86363.html>, jj

But here’s the reality check for the green movement: Obama has proposed no new strategy on climate, it’s unclear if one is in the works, and there’s no guarantee the issue will occupy a major place in the inaugural address or next month’s State of the Union. On alternative energy, his administration has committed billions of dollars, but made headlines so far mostly for the bankruptcy of Solyndra. And the administration soon could turn its back on its allies in the environmental community and approve the Keystone pipeline.

Between the constant fiscal crisis, the gun control debate and a looming immigration showdown, climate change runs the risk of landing on the permanent back burner.

***No action on climate or energy till after immigration***

**Zacharcy 12/30** Wendy Zachary is based in Texas, Texas, United States of America, and is a Reporter for Allvoices. 12-30-12, All Voices, Obama’s Second-Term Agenda: Immigration, gun control remain on top of list, <http://www.allvoices.com/contributed-news/13708159-obamas-second-term-agenda-immigration-and-gun-control-remain-on-top-of-the-list>, jj

"I've said that **fixing our broken immigration system is a top priority,"** he said. "I will introduce legislation in the first year to get that done. I think we have talked about it long enough."

Obama then said that the fight against gun violence is next on his list. He added that the success of a gun control law would depend upon just how badly it has hurt people psychologically.

"Will there be resistance? Absolutely there will be resistance," the president told host David Gregory. "And the question then becomes whether we are actually shook up enough by what happened here that it does not just become another one of these routine episodes where it gets a lot of attention for a couple of weeks and then it drifts away. It certainly won't feel like that to me. This is something that was the worst day of my presidency. And it's not something that I want to see repeated."

Obama further said that **once he will have addressed these** two pressing **issues, he would shift his focus on energy and environmental issues**. He said there is a huge opportunity of becoming self-sufficient in energy and if all goes as planned, America could even become an energy exporter.

### A2: General Budget/Spending Thumpers

#### No budget fights till summer --- immigration first

Policy Mic 3-28-13, Why Obama Signing Sequestration Into Law Was a Strategic Move, <http://www.policymic.com/articles/31012/why-obama-signing-sequestration-into-law-was-a-strategic-move>, jj

With over half of his term gone, and a huge laundry list of initiatives still tabled, every move Obama makes is a time management puzzle. And with another inevitable fight on the budget scheduled for the summer, it is time for him to focus on other things for the spring.¶ What is next for the president now that the budget is, for the moment, a settled issue? According to the White House, he is going to emphasize projects that do not require budgetary support: a raise to the minimum wage, immigration, and housing, for example.

### A2: Gun Control

#### No Obama push on guns

Jules Witcover, The Baltimore Sun, 3-18-13, Obama settles for half measures on gun control, <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2013-03-18/news/bs-ed-witcover-gun-control-20130318_1_assault-weapons-ban-fight-against-assault-weapons-gun-violence>, jj

Obama settles for half measures on gun control¶ The president fails to put his full energy behind post-Newtown proposals¶ For all the clamor from the White House and many in Congress to address the American scourge of gun violence, signs continue to point to a half-measure solution at best.¶ President Barack Obama's State of the Union plea to the nation's lawmakers that the victims of the Newtown and other tragedies "deserve a vote" on gun-control legislation is sounding more like advice to provide window-dressing than bold action to curb the mayhem.¶ The Obama administration has called for three-pronged approach that includes restoration of the assault-weapons ban enacted in 1994 but dropped in 2004, the tightening of background checks on gun purchases, especially at gun shows, and tougher limits on bullet-bearing gun clips and magazines.¶ The 10-to-8 partisan vote in the Senate Judiciary Committee last week to send another assault-weapons ban to the Senate floor suggests little more than an empty gesture. Sixty Senate votes are required to survive any threatened filibuster, and even passage there may well augur defeat in the Republican-controlled House.¶ In this light, a consensus seems to have emerged already that the best hopes for stronger action against gun violence lie in the other two legs of the White House proposal. These also face stiff opposition, particularly in the House, led by the NRA and gun owners in rural and western America.¶ Passage of these two will be hailed as a victory against gun violence even if the assault-weapons ban is not restored. But left untaken will be the most obvious step to convince a fearful nation that the senseless killing of kids and adults alike will be confronted in a direct and major way.¶ The principal sponsor of the assault-weapons ban, Sen. Dianne Feinstein of California, who also pushed through the original prohibition, acknowledged after the Judiciary Committee vote that "the road is uphill." All the president offered in a statement was that "the full Senate and the House need to vote on his bill, as well as the (other) measures advanced in the past week. Each of these proposals deserves a vote."¶ But while he has already endorsed the ban, the background checks and limits on bullets in gun cartridges, Mr. Obama's emphasis again seemed to be on achieving a vote on each rather than a demand for passage.

#### No further gun control action --- shifting to immigration

Santa Cruz Sentinel, 3-20-13, Editorial: Visa program needs reform as Congress falters on gun control, moves toward immigration changes, <http://www.santacruzsentinel.com/opinion/ci_22836083/editorial-visa-program-needs-reform-congress-falters-gun>, jj

Editorial: Visa program needs reform as Congress falters on gun control, moves toward immigration changes¶ Republicans, and lobbyists, make or break national reform efforts.¶ On the plus side, immigration reform seems to be moving forward. With last November's election calamity seared into their collective brains, Republicans this time around are working for changes that are grounded in the real world, rather than ideological wish fulfillments.¶ But on banning assault weapons, a lack of bipartisan support in Congress and the power of pro-gun lobbyists have once again proved decisive.¶ The Senate will take up gun regulations sometime next month, but without a measure from California Democratic Sen. Dianne Feinstein that would have stopped the sale of 157 "assault weapons," along with magazines holding more than 10 rounds of ammunition. Feinstein wrote the 1994 bill banning assault weapons that expired in 2004.¶ Still, what remains is worth pursuing: expanding background checks, strengthening penalties against gun trafficking and purchasing guns for others who aren't authorized to buy weapons. But the failure to take up a meaningful ban, while not surprising, is a clear victory for the National Rifle Association and its supporters -- and a loss to the millions of Americans who want common sense applied to gun laws. On immigration, Republicans in Congress are still working out a stand on the path to citizenship for those already in the country illegally. But party leaders know that if they want to prevail in national elections, they'll need to come up with an approach that, even if shy of outright citizenship, provides legal status for the 11 million people living and working in this country illegally.

## Link

### A2: PC Not K - (Hirsh)

#### \*\*Doesn’t say PC irrelevant --- just says it’s complex --- that’s fine, we’ve made specific claims about the interactions based on the current political climate

Hirsh 2/7 Michael Hirsh - chief correspondent for National Journal, previously senior editor and national economics correspondent for Newsweek, “There’s No Such Thing as Political Capital” February 7, 2013 http://www.nationaljournal.com/magazine/there-s-no-such-thing-as-political-capital-20130207

The point is not that “political capital” is a meaningless term. Often it is a synonym for “mandate” or “momentum” in the aftermath of a decisive election—and just about every politician ever elected has tried to claim more of a mandate than he actually has. Certainly, Obama can say that because he was elected and Romney wasn’t, he has a better claim on the country’s mood and direction. Many pundits still defend political capital as a useful metaphor at least. “It’s an unquantifiable but meaningful concept,” says Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute. “You can’t really look at a president and say he’s got 37 ounces of political capital. But the fact is, it’s a concept that matters, if you have popularity and some momentum on your side.”¶ The real problem is that the idea of political capital—or mandates, or momentum—is so poorly defined that presidents and pundits often get it wrong. “Presidents usually over-estimate it,” says George Edwards, a presidential scholar at Texas A&M University. “The best kind of political capital—some sense of an electoral mandate to do something—is very rare. It almost never happens. In 1964, maybe. And to some degree in 1980.” For that reason, political capital is a concept that misleads far more than it enlightens. It is distortionary. It conveys the idea that we know more than we really do about the ever-elusive concept of political power, and it discounts the way unforeseen events can suddenly change everything. Instead, it suggests, erroneously, that a political figure has a concrete amount of political capital to invest, just as someone might have real investment capital—that a particular leader can bank his gains, and the size of his account determines what he can do at any given moment in history.¶ Naturally, any president has practical and electoral limits. Does he have a majority in both chambers of Congress and a cohesive coalition behind him? Obama has neither at present. And unless a surge in the economy—at the moment, still stuck—or some other great victory gives him more momentum, it is inevitable that the closer Obama gets to the 2014 election, the less he will be able to get done. Going into the midterms, Republicans will increasingly avoid any concessions that make him (and the Democrats) stronger.

***\*Political scientists and experts vote neg***

**Beckman 10** Matthew N. Beckman, Professor of Political Science @ UC-Irvine, 2010, “Pushing the Agenda: Presidential Leadership in U.S. Lawmaking, 1953-2004,” pg. 50

However, many **close observers** of the presidential–congressional relationship have **long cited prevoting bargaining** across Pennsylvania Avenue **as being substantively important**. For example, discussing President Eisenhower’s legislative record in 1953, CQ staffers issued a caveat they have often repeated in the years since:¶ The **President’s leadership** often was tested beyond the glare spotlighting roll calls. . . . Negotiations off the floor and action in committee sometimes are **as important as the recorded votes**. (CQ Almanac 1953, 77)¶ **Many a political scientist has agreed**. Charles Jones (1994), for one, wrote, “However they are interpreted, roll call votes cannot be more than they are: one form of floor action on legislation. If analysts insist on scoring the president, concentrating on this stage of lawmaking can provide no more than a partial tally” (195). And Jon Bond and Richard Fleisher (1990) note that even if they ultimately are reflected in roll-call votes, “many important decisions in Congress are made in places other than floor votes and recorded by means other than roll calls . . . ” (68).

**A2: Winners Win**

***Controversial wins bleed momentum not build it.***

**Politico**, 1/20/20**10** (Obama's first year: What went wrong, p. http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=4DF829C9-18FE-70B2-A8381A971FA3FFC9)

**Obama believed that** early **success would be self-reinforcing, building** a powerful **momentum for bold** government **action. This belief was the essence of the White House’s theory of the “big bang” — that success in passing a** big **stimulus** package **would lead to success in** passing **health care, which** in turn **would clear the way for** major **cap-and-trade** environmental legislation and “re-regulation” of the financial services sector — all in the first year. **This proved to be a radical misreading of the dynamics of power. The massive cost of** the **stimulus** package and industry bailouts — combined with the inconvenient fact that unemployment went up after their passage — **meant that Obama spent the year bleeding momentum** **rather than steadily increasing public confidence** in his larger governing vision. **That vision was further obscured** for many Americans **by the** smoke from the bitter and **seemingly endless legislative battle on** Capitol Hill over **health care**.

***Wins don’t spill over. Climate proves.***

**Hertzberg**, 2/7/20**11** (Hendrik – senior editor and political essayist at the New Yorker, The New Yorker, p. http://www.newyorker.com/talk/comment/2011/02/07/110207taco\_talk\_hertzberg?printable=true)

Strong words. But now they are not even whispered. **The climate bill**, like hundreds of others less consequential, **met its fate on the legislative terminal ward** that is the United States Senate, **where bleeding is still the treatment of choice**. The bill died of complete organ failure, you might say. **The contributing causes included** the economic crisis, which made it easy to stoke fear; the power, money, and regional clout of sectors that benefit from the greenhouse-gas-producing status quo, especially the coal and oil industries; **the Republican** congressional **leadership’s determination** to forgo compromise in favor of a disciplined drive **to block anything that might resemble a victory for Obama**; the rise of the Tea Party right and the baleful influence of talk radio and Fox News; and, as always, the filibuster. But **Obama** and the White House **cannot escape blame. They botched** delicate **negotiations in the Senate**, were neglectful at key moments, **and expende**

**d little** of the courage, imagination, and **resources they brought to health-care reform. Perhaps they calculated that winning health care would strengthen them for climate change**, like Popeye after a helping of spinach. But **the political effect**, at least in its immediate manifestations, **was more like Kryptonite.**

#### Political inertia means closed fuel cycle policies cost PC

**Deign 12**—Jason Deign, June 13th, 2012, Nuclear Energy Insider, Nuclear fuel cycles: to close or not to close?, <http://analysis.nuclearenergyinsider.com/operations-maintenance/nuclear-fuel-cycles-close-or-not-close>, jj

The good news for policy makers is that the industry can probably afford to wait that long to get the answers. One UK academic consulted by Nuclear Energy Insider says: “We don’t need to make the decision now. At the moment the government is talking of an open fuel cycle.

“If we start building a reactor next year it will be 10 years before it burns fuel, and the spent fuel will need at least 100 years’ storage. It won’t go down into the ground until 2130, so we have plenty of time to reconsider. The open fuel cycle is a politically convenient decision.”

#### Congress hates reprocessing, especially after the sequester

Russell,2/5/13 (Pam, RollCall, “Budget Cutters Eye Nuclear Reprocessing Plant,” http://www.rollcall.com/news/budget\_cutters\_eye\_nuclear\_reprocessing\_plant-222173-1.html?pg=2)

¶ Given the threat of sequester, supporters of a $4.8 billion mixed oxide fuel fabrication facility worry that the Obama administration may be targeting the troubled nuclear reprocessing project in South Carolina for budget cuts.¶ The MOX project — created to fulfill an arms reduction agreement with Russia by turning 34 metric tons of weapons-grade plutonium into fuel for commercial reactors — is in its sixth year of construction and over budget by as much as $2 billion. ¶ It isn’t expected to be completed by its 2016 target date, and the Energy Department has found little interest from commercial power plant operators in buying the fuel, which would require costly reactor modifications. ¶ The Office of Management and Budget has been eyeing the project as a place to save money. And Rep. [Edward J. Markey](http://www.rollcall.com/members/220.html) of Massachusetts, the top Democrat on the Natural Resources Committee, has asked the Energy Department to provide updated costs figures by Feb. 15. ¶ At the request of House appropriators, the Government Accountability Office also is reviewing the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Plutonium Disposition Program, which comprises the MOX facility and associated buildings.¶ The scrutiny is raising concern among the project’s supporters, especially with across-the-board spending cuts set to kick in next month unless Congress acts to postpone them or enact an alternative austerity plan.

#### Opposition in House & Senate --- worried about spending

Russell,2/5/13 (Pam, RollCall, “Budget Cutters Eye Nuclear Reprocessing Plant,” http://www.rollcall.com/news/budget\_cutters\_eye\_nuclear\_reprocessing\_plant-222173-1.html?pg=2)

But critics say MOX is the most expensive way to dispose of the plutonium. The waste could more cheaply be vitrified, basically turned into glass or mixed with another material and stored at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in New Mexico. Hobson said he met with the Russians at the beginning of the project and learned they were not even considering using MOX technology because they considered it outdated. Russia instead is using fast reactors to burn the plutonium. ¶ “There is no national reason to do this,” Hobson said. ¶ In addition to questioning the need for the facility, critics also have concerns about the manner in which the National Nuclear Security Administration has managed the process.¶ “With considerable investments already made, the NNSA must show leadership and prove it has not undertaken an expensive and wasteful program which will ultimately produce a fuel that industry does not want or that presents unnecessary risks that exceed any nonproliferation benefits,” House appropriators wrote in their fiscal 2012 committee report.¶ Senate appropriators have also criticized the project’s management. In their fiscal 2013 committee report, they questioned why the NNSA spent $700 million over the past 13 years to design a plutonium disposition facility for the MOX project at Savannah River — only to terminate the project and decide that existing facilities could meet mission requirements. ¶ House and Senate appropriators also are concerned about the expected operating costs for the plant, which have risen to an estimated $499 million a year from $156 million. ¶ “We can’t afford that kind of stuff in today’s world,” Hobson said. “The budget hawks ought to be looking at this stuff. This is where there is real government waste.”

#### Massive opposition to the plan

**Bunn 3** - Associate Professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
Matthew, et al, "THE ECONOMICS OF REPROCESSING VS. DIRECT DISPOSAL OF SPENT NUCLEAR FUEL," <http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/repro-report.pdf>

Third, the argument is based on the questionable assumption that while it would be very difficult to gain public acceptance and licensing approval for a second repository, it would not be very difficult to do so for the complex and expensive spent fuel processing and transmutation facilities needed to implement this approach. This assumption appears very likely to be wrong. Reprocessing of spent fuel has been fiercely opposed by a substantial section of the interested public in the United States for decades—and such a transmutation approach inevitably would involve the handling of large quantities of extremely dangerous radionuclides in the presence of much larger sources of chemical or nuclear energy that might distribute them in the event of an accident than they would ever be exposed to below the ground. Similarly, there seems little doubt that licensing and building the new reactor types required would be an enormous institutional and political challenge.

#### Congress is skeptical reprocessing – empirics and budget

Lyman and von Hippel 8 (\*Edwin, a senior staff scientist at the Union of Concerned Scientists’ Global Security Program. \*Frank N. a professor of public and international affairs at Princeton University’s Program on Science and Global Security. “Reprocessing Revisited:The International Dimensions of the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership” <http://www.armscontrol.org/print/2779>)

In 2007, Congress became alarmed about the Energy Department’s proposal to commit quickly tens of billions of dollars to the construction of a huge reprocessing plant in the United States. The House Appropriations energy and water development subcommittee was particularly concerned and stated bluntly in the report on its proposed fiscal year 2008 energy and water appropriations bill that the “aggressive program proposed by the Department is at best premature” and that “before the Department can expect the Committee to support funding for a major new initiative, the Department must provide a complete and credible estimate of the life-cycle costs of the program.”[28] A few months later, a review of the Energy Department’s nuclear energy research and development program by the National Academy of Sciences’ National Research Council came to a similar conclusion when it reported that “[a]ll committee members agree that the GNEP program should not go forward and should be replaced by a less aggressive research program.”[29] Finally, in the House-Senate conference report that accompanied the consolidated appropriations act for fiscal year 2008, Congress instructed the Energy Department that “no funds are provided for facility construction for technology demonstration or commercialization.”[30] Accordingly, in its fiscal year 2009 budget request, submitted in February 2008, the Bush administration postponed plans to select sites for construction of a commercial-scale reprocessing plant and a fast-neutron reactor and only sought funds for research and development. It still proposes, however, to build a smaller facility at a national lab site to develop reprocessing techniques on a pilot-plant scale.[31] The decision on whether to push forward beyond the research and development stage will be left to the next administration and Congress.

#### Congress hates reprocessing and won’t fund it

Johnson, 7 (Jeff, “Reprocessing Key To Nuclear Plan” Chemical & Engineering News, 6/18, <http://pubs.acs.org/cen/government/85/8525gov1.html>)

Many in Congress have doubts about GNEP because of its size and cost and are concerned about its potential to provide terrorists and others easier access to separated plutonium. Some also worry it will draw away funds that are needed to complete Yucca Mountain. For 2007, Congress cut the Administration's GNEP request of $250 million to $168 million. For 2008, DOE is seeking $405 million, but the House Appropriations Committee in early June cut the request to $120 million and said, "It is unnecessary to rush into a plan that continues to raise concerns among scientists and has only weak support from industry."

The most controversial part of GNEP is the Administration's plan to reintroduce spent-fuel reprocessing in the U.S.

GNEP calls for construction by 2020 of the world's largest nuclear fuel reprocessing facility, capable of reprocessing 2,000 to 3,000 tons of spent reactor fuel a year. This is significantly larger than the French La Hague reprocessing plant—currently the biggest in the world—and large enough to reprocess all the waste generated annually by the U.S.'s 103 commercial nuclear power plants.

Located on the Cotentin Peninsula in Normandy, La Hague can treat 1,650 tons of spent fuel a year. Built as a commercial facility in 1976, La Hague now handles less than half its top design capacity, as its international business has come to an end. In addition to the French plant, an 800-ton facility is nearly ready to open in Japan, but it is unclear what will happen to the plutonium that becomes separated through reprocessing there.

The U.S. ended a fledgling reprocessing program during Jimmy Carter's presidency because he feared global proliferation of nuclear weapons. Carter's concern was heightened following India's detonation of a nuclear bomb in 1974. That bomb was made from plutonium that was reprocessed from an Indian civilian reactor provided by Canada with U.S. technical support.

Although President Ronald Reagan revoked a Carter executive order banning spent-fuel reprocessing, the U.S. continued to steer clear of reprocessing due to its cost. As a result, U.S. commercial reactors use nuclear fuel one time through and then store the spent fuel on-site with the intention of moving it eventually to a geologic repository.

That policy, Sell said, "makes no sense in a world where nuclear power is expanding." Spent fuel, he said, is an "incredible energy resource. Ninety-five percent of the energy value of uranium still is contained in spent fuel." Japan, France, Russia, and the U.K. reprocess nuclear fuel, he added.

A host of arms control groups, physicists, and members of Congress, however, have big doubts about GNEP, both on proliferation and economic grounds. They point to the same countries identified by Sell and note that some 250 tons of separated plutonium has been generated due to their reprocessing efforts—enough to make 30,000 nuclear bombs. The countries have stockpiled the plutonium but are not close to building a system of reactors to recycle the plutonium or a permanent waste repository. Reprocessing for some of these countries, particularly the U.K., has also resulted in extensive radioactivity pollution problems.

Then there is the funding issue. "GNEP is a waste of money," said Richard Garwin, a nuclear physicist and frequent governmental adviser on nuclear issues, speaking at a symposium of the American Association for the Advancement of Science earlier this year. He urged the U.S. to continue on its current path of storing the waste on-site while developing a geological repository. This strategy is far cheaper as well as more proliferation-resistant than reprocessing, he added.

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***Hasn’t even been appropriated by Congress yet***

Jeffrey **Tomich 12**, energy and environment reporter for the St. Louis Post-Dispatch, 4/25/12, “Small nuclear reactors generate hype, questions about cost,” <http://www.stltoday.com/business/local/small-nuclear-reactors-generate-hype-questions-about-cost/article_39757dba-8e5c-11e1-9883-001a4bcf6878.html#ixzz1tTlcQ1Jt>

The Obama administration, which is pushing for development of low-carbon energy technologies, sees potential, too. And the president wants the United States to take the lead in developing the industry.

Last month, **Obama proposed $452 million to help speed up development of small modular reactors**. The funding availability would come on top of $8 billion in loan guarantees for the Vogtle twin-reactor nuclear project in Georgia.

**The federal funding**, **which has yet to be appropriated by Congress**, **would support engineering, design certification and licensing** of up to two plant designs that have the potential to be licensed and in commercial operation in a decade.

#### Obama silent on nuclear now --- also proves generic “energy battles now” doesn’t take out link --- oil, renewables, are popular --- nuclear is toxic

WNN 2-13-13, World Nuclear News, Obama neglects nuclear in state of the union, <http://www.world-nuclear-news.org/EE-Obama_neglects_nuclear_in_state_of_the_union_130213a.html>, jj

US President Barack Obama clearly acknowledged the threat of climate change and the pressing need to do something about it in his annual state of the union address. He highlighted the potential for solar, wind and even natural gas - but nuclear power received not a single mention.

In a speech that also covered many aspects of American life such as taxation, health, education and immigration he urged increased investment in science, innovation and manufacturing to help the country become a "magnet" for high-tech jobs. No area held more promise for this, he noted, than "investments in American energy" which provide opportunity for growth in the face of climate change.

However, only certain energy technologies were deemed worthy of mention in this regard - namely wind, solar and natural gas. Obama enthused that half of all new installed capacity in 2012 was wind energy, while solar "gets cheaper by the year". Natural gas was hailed primarily as ushering in a new era of energy independence for which the administration would "keep cutting red tape and speeding up new oil and gas permits."

Noteworthy was the absence of any mention of nuclear or hydropower - the country's two largest sources of low carbon electricity providing approximately 20% and 10% of electricity respectively. The absence of nuclear stands out as remarkable given its unique deployability and that the USA pioneered the early development of the technology. The government continues to invest in the research of advanced nuclear concepts such as small modular reactors, while US vendors are actively selling their designs at home and overseas. Last year saw the start of construction work at four new units - the first to receive approval in about 30 years.

Obama only once mentioned the 'all-of-the-above' energy plan which had characterised previous addresses and which outlined a role for all energy technologies, but this was in the context of natural gas. Mention of coal was also entirely absent from the speech despite the fact that it provides around 40% of US electricity.